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David Evan Cron (1879)

David Evan Cron
Born in Cleator Moor, Cumberland, Englandmap
Ancestors ancestors
[spouse(s) unknown]
[children unknown]
Died [date unknown] [location unknown]
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Profile last modified | Created 17 Sep 2014
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Biography

One of the sadnesses that drove Richard, Mathew and Jacob to travel to South Africa to seek a better life. David Cron was helping to support his widowed mother and siblings.

The Times 20th November 1894 Flooding Of A Mine On Saturday some workmen were engaged in blasting at the Birks iron ore pit, near Whitehaven, when a large volume of water burst into the workings with terrible force, causing great damage to the property. A man named David Harrison, aged 33 years, living at Cleator Moor, was subsequently found dead, and two lads, named Thomas Toye, and David Crone, both aged 15 years, and belonging to Wath Brow, Cleator Moor, are still missing. It is feared that they, too, have been drowned, but every possible search is being made for them. Another man, named Thomas Watson, of Cleator Moor, was rescued alive, but he was badly injured.

Thanks to Hilary Wishart Wilson for this research. Also See mining report below

Date: 17th November 1894 Colliery: Birks, No. 7 Pit

Cause: Irruption of Water Lives Lost: 3

Description

The most disastrous accident in this district, either under the Coal or Metalliferous Mines Acts, occurred on the 17th November at Birks Hematite Iron Ore Mine, situated at Frizington, Cumberland, whereby three lives were lost from an inrush of water from some old workings. The Frizington Mining Company, Limited, are the owners; Messrs Walker and Peile, of Whitehaven, the engineers; and Mr. James B. Kitchin the resident manager, and he has held that position for nearly 10 years, or about three years longer than Messrs. Walker and Peile have held their appointments. At that time, namely in 1887, there were five pits closed in the royalty, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, the workings of which were all filled with water. No. 7 pit was then in operation, and has been up to the present time. In July 1891 a rise drift was commenced from a certain point in the No. 7 pit workings to win some ore, which had been proved by borings to exist in the direction of the old No. 4 pit workings, and this was carried on continuously till December 1893. In August of that year it was thought desirable to remove some of the water in the old workings, in view of the new drift approaching in their direction and pumping operations were consequently commenced at the No. 1 pit, the workings of which were connected with those of Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5, which had been abandoned for some years, the engineers being under the impression that all the water in No. 4 pit except that lying in the dip drift (B. D. on plan) would be removed by these operations. This expectation was realised when pumping ceased, in March 1894. In October 1893 further precautions were taken by means of boring at the face of the drift, in the roof, and on either side, and a strong dam, fitted with a valve, was put in to regulate the flow of water in case of its being tapped by any of the boreholes. This dam was fitted with a door which had to be closed or put on a "trig" whenever shots were fired or when the men left the face of the drift for any other purpose. A further instruction was that no shots should be fired in the day shift, that is, when the bulk of the men were in the pit. All the above precautions were attended to, and the instructions carried out, until the drift was stopped in December 1893, when it was thought that the point of intersection with the old dip had been passed. Nothing further was done in the drift till October 1894, when work was resumed, and continued till the day of the accident. The men were apparently told to adhere to the rules laid down for their guidance in the first instance, but they do not appear to have been rigidly enforced, and the men themselves admitted at the inquest that they felt so secure that they had repeatedly left the door of the dam open when they had been away from the face, and that not only had shots been fired with the door open on the morning of the accident, but that it was in that position at the time the water broke in, although the men were back from the face. The front borehole was continued up to the time of the disaster, and the flank boreholes on the right-hand side of the drift were also put in for some distance after operations re-commenced, but the flank holes on the left-hand side were soon discontinued, as being unnecessary, for the following reasons : — No suspicion ever arose in the minds of anyone as to the correct position of No. 4 pit, or of the level (C. D. E.), and the only place where it was thought an error might exist was in the direction of the old dip (B. D.). Of the position of the workings of No. 7 pit, and of the new drift, the engineers were satisfied from check surveys they had been able to make. It was agreed, therefore, that if the old dip deviated to the west the two places would be too far apart to be connected by a borehole, and if, on the other hand, a mistake was made in the opposite direction or to the east the old dip would be in advance of the new drift, and that it would consequently be cut into by the leading borehole. As it turned out, however, as is shown on the plan, the direction of the old dip was right. It should be stated here with reference to the boreholes, that they were all in an upward direction, the general opinion being that the old dip was driven in the top part of the No. 3 shale, which is 17 feet thick, whereas the new drift was in the bottom of the same bed, and that there would consequently be a thickness of 6 feet of shale between the two roads. This opinion was based upon the evidence the managers had been able to collect from men who had worked in No. 4 pit, and from information gleaned as to the nature of the ground proved by the boreholes near the bottom of the old dip as shown on the plan. The opinion thus formed, however, turned out to be an erroneous one, and consequently all the safety boreholes were practically valueless even if the position of the drift as shown on the plan had been correct. For a few days a slight dampness had been noticed on the left-hand side of the drift, but not to such an extent as had been seen farther back, and no one anticipated the slightest danger from its appearance The manager, Mr. Kitchin, however, who was in the drift on the morning of the accident, seeing that the moisture had increased, decided to stop work in the forebreast at the completion of the day's work and have a borehole put into the side at the point where the water was showing, and he marked the spot where this work had to be done on the following Monday. On the manager leaving the place, the two men, Thomas Watson and David Harrison, went on with their work, and after firing two shots, which did not affect, however, the place where the water came in, they were getting their breakfast outside the dam when there was a loud report, followed by a sudden rush of water, which immediately enveloped Thomas Watson and carried him at headlong speed down the incline and along the level for a distance of about 200 yards, where he was afterwards found alive, but much shaken. The second man, David Harrison, not so fortunate, must have been caught by some of the debris, for his body was found the same afternoon under a mass of loose material just beyond the bottom of the incline. A third man, Owen Kelly, who was with two boys, David Crone and Thomas Toy, at the bottom of the incline, ran to a side road called No. 11 working, and so escaped, whilst the two lads, who thought the noise was caused by a tub running amain, stopped in a man-hole and were suffocated by the water and debris, with which the hole was almost filled. The No. 11 working above referred to is the place to which the men were warned to go in case of need, and where they went to get their bait until the place was stopped in December 1893, and had they continued to follow out their instructions there would have been no loss of life. The injured man, Thomas Watson, was subsequently able to give evidence at the inquest, held by Mr. John Webster on the 19th November, the 12th December 1894, and the 2nd January 1895, and as he had been employed in the drift from its commencement and was in a position to give a minute account of all that transpired during its progress, it will be desirable perhaps to reproduce his evidence here, more especially as it corroborated not only the evidence of his fellow workmen, but also that called on behalf of the management. It was as follows, namely :— I live at Greystone Terrace, Wath Brow, Cleator Moor. I am a miner, and recently worked for the Frizington Mining Company. I remember the accident on the 17th November last. On that day I went to my work at the Birks Pit at 6 a.m. I was engaged in driving No, 18 drift. David Harrison and I each bored a hole in the forebreast, or nearly in the forebreast. We completed those holes about 10 o'clock, charged them with dynamite, and fired them. We retired from No. 18, went through the dam, and just down the brake a little bit. We waited till the holes went off; and then went back up to the dam and got our bait. About half-an-hour after firing, the water broke in and came through the door of the damn. The water hit me, and I know of very little what took place after that. I had instructions as to how we were to conduct these boring operations from Mr. Kitchin, the manager of the mine, who was daily in attendance, and gave us directions from time to time, and who had also given us general instructions. Our instructions were to do the same as we were told in 1893 ; that in case we saw any danger of water we were to go to No. 11, where we would be perfectly safe; and that we were always to close down the door in the dam before we fired. At the time of the accident the door was not closed. We really did not think it was necessary, owing to the position in which we had our shot holes. We had also instructions to keep the door of the dam on the "trig," in ease of the water breaking through, and that when we were out of the working place we were to keep the door on the "trig." When we left the place on the morning of the accident, after lighting the shots, the door was neither closed nor on the "trig." By Mr. Hedley: We followed the night shift men, and I was the first man on the day shift. I met Nancurvis, one of the drift night shift men, that morning as I was going to my work. We had a conversation as to what had been done, but he made no suggestions respecting the work in No. 18. When we first went in there was a leading hole, but we did not do anything to it. The men on the day shift generally attended to the leading hole. I looked at it that morning, but did nothing to it. I do not know what depth it was. We were supposed to keep it 5ft. 6in, to 6ft. ahead, but I did not measure it. I had no instructions not to go on with the leading hole ; we had other work to do, and we wanted to square up to the breast ; that was the reason we did nothing to the leading hole. Josiah Boden, the deputy, was in the working at about eight o'clock ; I was boring at the time. He just looked round to see that all was safe ; he did not look at the leading borehole, and I do not remember that anything was said about it. Our manager, Mr. Kitchin, came in about nine o'clock. I had that morning discovered a slow dropping of water from a piece of rock on the left-hand side, back from the forebreast. I had previously noticed it was moist, but that was the first time I noticed a drop. I drew Mr. Kitchin's attention to it. Mr. Kitchin gave me instructions about it, and marked out where a hole was to be bored on the following Monday morning. That meant that on Monday morning there would be no working in the forebreast until the hole was bored. The hole was to be bored to prove this dampness, to see if there was any water behind it. I agreed with Mr. Kitchin that it was desirable to do this. I was not at all afraid that any water would come in at that point. After lighting the shots we went through the dam and five or six fathoms down the brake, and afterwards returned close to the dam to get our bait. Harrison and I have baited there since we went back to this work. In 1893 we used to get our bait at the foot of the incline. — Was that according to instructions ? Well, I don't remember anything about where we were to get our bait. It was a more suitable place to get our bait — If it was suitable in 1893 it would be suitable in 1894, would it not ? — Yes, just the same, except it was further to walk. — But it would be the same in 1893 ? Yes ; we went to the foot of the incline to be further away in case of anything occurring. We were told by Mr. Kitchin that in case of anything occurring we were to make for No. 11 drift, which was about seven or eight fathoms from the foot of the incline. We got our bait in No. 11 when we first started the drift in 1893. We continued getting our bait at the brake foot, or in No. 11, until the work stopped in 1893, when we thought we had got past where the water was. When we started in 1894 we had instructions to carry out the same rules, but we did not go to bait at the bottom of the incline or into No. 11, because we thought it was too far to go. As we thought we had got past where the water was, we did not think the danger was so great, and we had got a bit hardened — we thought ourselves more secure. Mr. Kitchin, Mr. Boden, and Mr. Murphy were coming in at all times of the day. I don't remember them having been in at any time while we were getting our bait. It is possible they may not have known that we were baiting up at the dam. — You say your instructions were always to keep the door on the "trig." Are you correct in saying you were to keep it on the "trig" when men were inside boring holes ? is that not a mistake ? — Well, it may be a mistake, but they told us that. — You did keep it on the "trig" when you were working ? Yes, very often. The Coroner : Then why had not you the door on the "trig" that morning, when you were boring ? Because the bogies were then passing in and out. Mr. Hedley : But the bogies were not passing in and out when you fired the shots ? No. — And the only reason you give for not putting the door on the" trig" then was the position of the holes ? Yes, they were back from the breast; they were not leading holes, and we did not anticipate any danger. — But you have told us your instructions were to place the door on the "trig" when you left the place any time, and why did you not do it ? Well, just that we did not anticipate any danger; we always looked to have it down when we fired leading shots into the breast. — That was the reason why I asked you whether you had any conversation with the men of the previous shift. Were there any indications of a shot having been fired in the leading hole that morning ? No ; not in the leading hole. — Have there been any flank holes bored since you started this last time in October ? Yes, I think so ; but there have been none recently on the left-hand side. 1 do not know why they were left off. We were ordered to let the flank holes be, and just bore this hole in front. I myself was satisfied with those directions at the time. It was some time before the accident happened that we were told to leave the flank holes. We have on other occasions left the door open when we were firing small holes back from the breast. I cannot remember that on any of those occasions any of the officials of the pit were present when such shots were fired. I do not know whether they would know or not. By Mr. Paisley (solicitor) : The top of the sweating was better than half-way up the side of the drift, on the left-hand side, and extended down to the sole. I put my hand on it several times, and I also sounded that part of the drift. I found it damp, but not a great lot. I have worked as a miner for 20 years and more. — Can you tell me how many shots would be fired between the place where you saw the drop and the forebreast ? I could not say. On my shifts four or five shots a day would be fired ; and we would have been working for about a week after passing that place. I have said that I do not remember anything having been said at any time as to where we were to get our bait. That is true. The instruction to go into No. 11 was not given to me particularly, but to us all. — When ? Oh, on different occasions. By the Coroner The sweating that I noticed was not unusual, and did not surprise me. It did not indicate to me any danger when I found my hand moist. By a jury man (Mr. McLaughlin) Is there anything in the Metalliferous Mines Act about these side borings ? — Mr. Hedley : No, there is not. — Mr. McLaughlin Well, it is a pity; it ought to be. — Mr. Hedley It is a pity. — Mr. McLaughlin It seems there is no compulsion ? — Mr. Hedley: No, not under the Metalliferous Act. An examination of the new drift subsequent to the accident showed that the water had broken in on the left-hand side, 37 feet nearer to the face than was expected and about 11 feet back from the face. A shell of shale 2 feet thick, which divided the old dip from the new drift, had been forced away by the volume of water, leaving a hole about 4 feet in the side of the drift, as shown in the section A. B. An inspection of the old dip, section B. D., demonstrated the fact that there were grounds for the statements made by the men who originally worked there that the sole of the dip was not on the limestone, but was of shale, and though it was probably the intention of the then manager to continue the dip through the shale until the upper limestone became the roof, it is evident that the men were mistaken in supposing that they had gone so far. It may be asked, why was not the dam, although the door was open, sufficient to arrest the flow of water to such an extent as to enable the men to escape. From the evidence it appeared that some minutes elapsed after the water first made its appearance and washed Watson away, and the time when the final crash came and Harrison was overwhelmed with the debris, probably when he was making his way slowly down the incline through the stream of water passing through the door. Under ordinary circumstances the dam, which was constructed of wood, would no doubt have resisted the pressure, but the after examination showed that two lengths of pump stocks, 8 inches in diameter and 18 feet long, had become disconnected from a range of pipes which had been left in the old dip, and sliding down the slippery floor of the inclined drift, had come into contact with one of the main uprights of the dam with the force of a heavy battery ram, and so caused one side of it to give way, with the consequent heavy rush of water, which carried drum wheel, timber, rails, and everything else before it. Had the dam door been shut, in all human probability the pipes referred to would not have been disturbed from their position in the old dip. That the plans were incorrect in some respects was without doubt, and a careful inquiry was instituted with the view of discovering where the error lay. When Messrs. Walker and Peile took charge of the mine in 1887, two tracings came into their possession, on the one being the old workings of Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 pits, whilst the second tracing showed the workings of No. 7 pit, then in active operation. At a subsequent date a new plan was made by Messrs. Walker and Peile by transferring the workings shown on the two tracings in question on to one sheet, which then became the working plan, on which the surveys of No. 7 pit workings were plotted from time to time, due allowance being made for the variations of the magnetic meridian. Of the correctness of their own surveys the engineers were satisfied, as they were able to check the work by means of the staple pits at different points in the workings, and that they were justified in the assumption was proved by the check survey afterwards made. The short extent of workings on the south side of No. 4 pit also led them to believe that reliance could be placed on their accuracy. Whether a surface survey to check the position of the different shafts was made at the time the transfer was made is not known, but in the absence of any evidence on the point it is fair to assume that it was not. Subsequent to the accident a complete survey was made both of the surface and of the underground roads between Nos. 4 and 7 pits, which proved that the relative positions of those two shafts were incorrect, with the result that the old dip was thrown further to the east than is shown on the working plan (see sketch herewith). The survey also proved that the transfer from the two old tracings had been correctly made by Messrs. Walker and Peile's surveyor, and that the error as to the position of the No. 4 pit was one which had been made many years ago, but by whom it is impossible to say, as the plans had passed through the hands of several mining engineers before coming into the possession of the gentlemen at present in charge of the mines. Had a complete survey of the surface been made in recent years it is probable the mistake would have been discovered, so far as the position of No. 4 Pit was concerned, but no suspicion seems to have arisen as to the correctness of the plans in that respect, and consequently such a course was never suggested. Even had this been done, and the error rectified, the mistake as to the respective positions of the new drift and the old dip in the No. 3 shale would, for the reasons mentioned before, probably have led to a like disaster. A question was raised by Mr. Marston, the miners' agent, at the inquest, as to the feasibility of pumping out the water from the old dip before an attempt was made to effect the communication, and Mr. Peile, in his evidence, stated that this could have been done had plant been put down for the purpose. It is quite true that this could have been done, but had the point been followed up it would have transpired that this mode of procedure was discussed when the bulk of the water was removed from No. 4 pit, but rejected on the ground that its cost would have been out of all proportion to the value of the ore to be won, and, further, that it was considered quite possible, due precautions being taken, to tap the water in the manner agreed upon, without danger. Unfortunately these precautions were neglected by the men themselves, with the result that three lives were practically thrown away. The operations in progress for tapping this water had recently been brought to my knowledge by my assistant, Mr. Leck, who visited the mine a fortnight before the accident, and after an examination of the new drift and a careful inspection of the plans with the engineers and manager, reported to me that due precautions were being taken for the protection of the men, and that he would watch the operations there. The verdict of the jury was to the effect "that the deceased were accidentally drowned on the 17th November 1894, owing to the water in the dip workings of No. 4 pit breaking into the No. 18 working of No. 7 pit, Birks, Frizington, but the jury blame the engineers for not pumping the water from No. 4 pit immediately they became unaware of its whereabouts." The latter part of the verdict was evidently based upon the suggestion thrown out by Mr. Marston, that the water might have been pumped from the old dip, but in adopting the course they did, Messrs. Walker and Peile cannot be said to have acted in any way contrary to the usual practice in such cases, and I am not prepared, therefore, in view of all the circumstances, to endorse it. The lesson to be learned from this accident is one that has been taught in so many similar cases, namely, to look upon all old plans with suspicion unless they can be verified by actual survey, and, to accept information tendered from memory or hearsay only, merely as suggestions for one's guidance and aids to investigation, and never as actual facts. The sketch accompanying this Report shows, first, a plan of so much of No. 4 pit, old working, and of the drift of No. 7 pit as is necessary to explain the cause of this accident, the red lines giving the position of No. 4 pit level and dip as shown on the working plan, and the black lines giving the actual position of those workings as proved by subsequent survey secondly, a section (A. B.) of No. 18 drift, showing the position of dam and place of irruption ; thirdly, a section (B. D.) of the old dip, showing its position in the No. 3 shale; and, fourthly, a section of the level from No. 4 pit. Source: 1894 Mines Inspectors Report (C 7667), Newcastle District (No. 3) by J. L. Hedley, H.M. Inspector of Mines, copy held in the Scottish Mining Museum, Newtongrange, Midlothian.

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