Oklahoma in The Great War

Camp Doniphan

Camp Doniphan (1917-1918) - A U.S. Army World War I National Guard Mobilization and Training Camp first established in 1917 near Lawton, Comanche County, Oklahoma. Named Camp Doniphan in G.O. 95, 18 Jul 1917, after Colonel Alexander W. Doniphan, who served in the Mexican War.

The first commander of the camp was Major General William M. Wright who organized the 35th U.S. Infantry Division on 13 Sep 1917 and initiated training. The 35th departed the U.S. through Camp Mills and the Hoboken Port of Embarkation on 25 Apr 1918 arriving in France on 11 May 1918. The 35th returned to the U.S. and was demobilized 30 May 1919 at Camp Funston (1), Kansas.

At the end of the war Camp Doniphan was abandoned and the temporary buildings were removed.

Native Americans in World War I

Approximately 25% of the United States Army was composed of Indigenous Native Americans.

Choctaw Code Talkers

Colonel A. W. Bloor, the commander of the 142nd Infantry Regiment. The memo he sent to the Headquarters read:

Headquarters 142nd Infantry, A.E.F. January 23, 1919, A.P.O. No. 796

From: C.O. 142nd Infantry

To: The Commanding General 36th Division (Attention Capt. Spence)

Subject: Transmitting messages in Choctaw

1. In compliance with memorandum, Headquarters 36th Division, January 21, 1919, to C.O. 142nd Infantry, the following account is submitted

In the first action of the 142nd Infantry at St. Etienne, it was recognized that of all the various methods of liaison the telephone presented the greatest possibilities. The field of rocket signals is restricted to a small number of agreed signals. The runner system is slow and hazardous. T.P.S. is always an uncertain quantity. It may work beautifully and again, it may be entirely worthless. The available means, therefore, for the rapid and full transmission of information are the radio, buzzer and telephone, and of these the telephone was by far the superior, -- provided it could be used without let or hindrance, -- provided straight to the point information could be given.

It was well understood however, that the German was a past master of “listening in" moreover, from St. Etienne to the Aisne we had traveled through a county netted with German wire and cables. We established P.C.’s in dugouts and houses, but recently occupied by him. There was every reason to believe every decipherable message or word going over our wires also went to the enemy. A rumor was out that our Division had given false coordinates of our supply dump, and that in thirty minutes the enemy shells were falling on the point. We felt sure the enemy knew too much. It was therefore necessary to code every message of importance and coding and decoding took valuable time.

While comparatively inactive at Vaux-Champagne, it was remembered that the regiment possessed a company of Indians. They spoke twenty-six different languages or dialects, only four or five of which were ever written. There was hardly one chance in a million that Fritz would be able to translate these dialects and the plan to have these Indians transmit telephone messages was adopted. The regiment was fortunate in having two Indian officers who spoke several of the dialects. Indians from the Choctaw tribe were chosen and one placed in each P.C.

The first use of the Indians was made in ordering a delicate withdrawal of two companies of the 2nd Bn. from Chufilly to Chardoney on the night of October 26th. This movement was completed without mishap, although it left the Third Battalion, greatly depleted in previous fighting, without support. The Indians were used repeatedly on the 27th in preparation for the assault on Forest Farm. The enemy’s complete surprise is evidence that he could not decipher the messages.

After the withdrawal of the regiment to Louppy-le-Petit, a number of Indians were detailed for training in transmitting messages over the telephone. The instruction was carried on by the Liaison Officer Lieutenant Black. It had been found that the Indian’s vocabulary of military terms was insufficient. The Indian for “Big Gun” was used to indicate artillery. “Little gun shoot fast”, was substituted for machine gun and the battalions were indicated by one, two and three grains of corn. It was found that the Indian tongues do not permit verbatim translation, but at the end of the short training period at Louppy-le-Petit, the results were very gratifying and it is believed, had the regiment gone back into the line, fine results would have been obtained. We were confident the possibilities of the telephone had been obtained without its hazards.

A.W. Bloor, Colonel 142nd Infantry Commanding.

Choctaw Code Talkers on Texas Military Forces Museum website

Choctaw Code Talkers Wikitree