Actually, the Bridgeman decision seems to me to be strongly on the other side of the issue, that any reproduction of material in the public domain without "distinguishable variation" is not newly copyrightable. At the heart of the Bridgeman case were paintings in the public domain that Corel Corp. took photographs of and then sold as royalty-free stock art. I actually own a couple of those CDs; used one of the images as the basis for a book cover back when I had a small book publishing business. Corel didn't attempt to claim copyright for the photographs they took, but Bridgeman tried to claim that they had already reproduced the paintings in photographic form and, therefore, Corel had infringed copyright. The U.S. District Court dismissed Bridgeman's claims initially in 1998 and in appeal in 1999.
In my not-a-lawyer opinion, there is far more opportunity to add originality to photographs of old-master paintings hanging in a museum than there is in the faithful reproduction of public domain documents or books. I'd go so far as to say that, in Barry's example, if he posed a model beside the FHC computer monitor, gesturing to it, and took a photograph of that staged setting, he could claim copyright for the resultant image, even though the image contained, in part, public domain material. But as I'll cite in a minute, I believe we have precedent that copyright protection isn't extended "where a photograph of a photograph or other printed matter is made that amounts to nothing more than slavish copying."
And the "slavish copying" thing (unfortunate term; not mine; quoting) doesn't always apply to just two-dimensional original material like a painting or a document. In ruling against the 1999 Bridgeman Art Library appeal, the court cited the 1976 L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder case that involved the company's claim to copyright for a plastic reproduction of an old mechanical cast-iron coin bank that had passed into the public domain. That case decision was, in part:
"Absent a genuine difference between the underlying work of art and the copy of it for which protection is sought ... the constitutional demand could hardly be served. To extend copyrightability to minuscule variations would simply put a weapon for harassment in the hands of mischievous copiers intent on appropriating and monopolizing public domain work. Even in Mazer v. Stein ... which held that the statutory terms 'works of art' and 'reproduction of works of art' ... permit copyright of quite ordinary mass-produced items, the Court expressly held that the objects to be copyrightable, 'must be original, that is, the author's tangible expression of his ideas.' 347 U.S. at 214, 74 S. Ct. at 468, 98 L. Ed. at 640. No such originality, no such expression, no such ideas here appear."
The Bridgeman decision also cited Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony (1884) because, even though a century old, in it the Supreme Court held that photographs are "writings" within the meaning of the then-extant copyright law. At issue in that case, however, was not a photograph of a static, public domain item; it was a portrait and the photo was deemed sufficiently original by virtue of the subject's pose, the lighting, arrangement of background items and accessories in the photograph, etc.
It was later suggested that the 1909 Copyright Act protected all photographs independent of their originality, but that view was eventually rejected by the Supreme Court (Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350-53, 111 S. Ct. 1282, 113 L. Ed. 2d 358; 1991). In that decision the Supreme Court noted that "sweat of the brow" alone is not the "creative spark" which is the "sine qua non of originality." Which would seem directly applicable to, for example, the expense and effort of producing exact digital copies of, say, many thousands of census records, BDM, or land records, and then making them available to the public free or for-fee.
In the Bridgeman decision also was a reference to Nimmer on Copyright, by Melville B. Nimmer and completed by his son, David. This is a multi-volume set dealing with U.S. copyright law that has been cited in over 2,500 court decisions:
"As the Nimmers have written, there 'appear to be at least two situations in which a photograph should be denied copyright for lack of originality,' one of which is directly relevant here: 'where a photograph of a photograph or other printed matter is made that amounts to nothing more than slavish copying.' The authors thus conclude that a slavish photographic copy of a painting would lack originality, although they suggest the possibility that protection in such a case might be claimed as a 'reproduction of a work of art.' But they immediately go on to point out that this suggestion is at odds with the Second Circuit's in banc decision in L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder."
The Bridgeman decision goes on to clarify that the mechanism of reproduction of public domain material also isn't relevant, whether a photograph, photocopy, digital scan, or microfilm:
"The requisite 'distinguishable variation,' moreover, is not supplied by a change of medium, as 'production of a work of art in a different medium cannot by itself constitute the originality required for copyright protection.'" (citing Past Pluto Productions v. Dana, 627 F. Supp. 1435, 1441; S.D.N.Y. 1986)
The conclusion of the Bridgeman case was: "Plaintiff's motion for reargument and reconsideration of this Court's order granting summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted. Nevertheless, on reargument and reconsideration, defendant Corel Corporation's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted."
And again, my observations have nothing to do with WikiTree policy and terms of use. WikiTree disavows any knowledge of my actions. I'm trying to address only the legality of using an existing copy, or making a new copy, of material already in the public domain.
Edited: Darned typos; tiny keys. Good thing I was never a surgeon. And the "edit" link is pretty close to the "hide" link. Just sayin'...