u.s.s. Chub (SS 329)

SS329/116-3

Serial (065

c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif., 21 June 1945.

DEGLASSIFIED-A-L

The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. CHUB (SS 329). The Commander-in-Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.

Via:

The Commander Submarine Division THREE HUNDRED ONE

The Commander Submarine Squadron THIRTY. The Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET. The Commander-in-Chief, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject:

U.S.S. CHUB - Report of War Patrol Number Two.

Enclosures:

(A) Subject Report.
(B) Track Chart (Seventh Fleet only).

Enclosure (A), Covering the SECOND war patrol of this vessel conducted in the waters of Java Sea during the period of 19 May 1945 to 18 June 1945, is forwarded herowith.

C. D. RHYMES, Ja

DECLASSIFIED-ART. 0445, OPNAVINST 5510.10

DECLASSIFIED

(A) PROLOGUE

Arrived Fremantle, West Australia, 18 April 1945 from First War Patrol. Normal refit conducted by Relief Crew of Submarine Division 301, while officers and crew spent a most enjoyable rest period of 14 days. Renewed No. 2 periscope and installed ST radar in No. 1 position. Regular officers and crew returned on 4 May 1945. We were well pleased with the refit job and especially pleased with the cleanliness of the ship throughout. The following officers were detached: Lieut-Condr. William R. DE LOACH, Jr., USN, and Lieut-Comdr. Robert W. MC INTOSH, USN. The following officers reported aboard for duty: Lieut(jg). Robert T. REHTMEYER, USNR, and Ensign Arnett B. TAYLOR, USN, Conducted 8 days training under Captain J. L. HULL, USN, and Captain P.H. ROSS, USN. Ready for sea 14 May 1945.

	(B) M	RRATIVE	
File No.	Officers	Rank In	Total Patrols cluding This One
74884 97004 187845 223881 253682 204204 199373 258456 390057	REHTMEYER, Robert T. CORDRAY, Austin E. QUINLAN, John W. WATTS, Even E. SCHLICHT, John M.	Lieutenant, USNR	Eight Nine One Two Four Thirteen Two Two One
Ser. No.	Chief Petty Officers	Rete In	Total Patrols cluding This One
228 27 74 201 32 34 616 77 75 243 60 70 381 17 59 337 03 22 437 23 23	ADAMS, Edward A. BROOKS, Charles EMMONS, Charles R. HILIMAN, Paul MERFELD, Marvin E. SCHMIDT, Fred H. WEISH, Robert A.	CTM CMOMM CLIOMM CEM CEM- CMOMM CRM	Four Seven Two Ten Eleven Seven Eight

14 May (1) ALL TIMES ITEM (-9)

Departed Fremantle, Wost Australia, independently, with ford memories of the place and sincore hopes of refitting here again. Too much cannot be said for the morale building effect of a refit and rest period in West Australia. Conducted gun firing on towed target during afternoon. Conducted end around

runs and attacks on CORPUS CHRISTIE during afternoon and evening.

15 May to 18 May (2-5)

Enroute Lombok Strait. Conducted training dives, drills, school of boat, and exercised crew at battle stations. Passed USS BAYA enroute. Manufactured and installed new hinge pin in bow buoyancy vent operating gear.

Long. 112-58 E. Lat. 29-25 S 1200 15 May ... Long. 112-33 E. 1200 16 May Lat. 24-42 S Long. 113-35 E. Lat. 18-45 S 1200 17 May . Long. 115-07 E. Lat. 13-09 S 18 May . 1200

19 May (6) Noon: Let. 08-51 S Long. 115-46 E.

O702 Submerged in Southern entrance to Lombok Strait, Patrolled Southern entrance during the day, just holding our own against the current.

1957 Surfaced. Stood South for 45 minutes charging batteries then reversed course.

2117 Commenced transit of Lombok Strait on 3 engines. No contacts in the strait.

20 May (7) Noon: Lat. 06-16 S Long. 116-09 E.

0030 Completed transit of Lombok and set course to pass West of Kangean Island.

\$103 Went to 4 engine speed and altered course to pass East of Kangean.

0210 Exchanged calls with BECUNA.

0445 Sent serial one to Comsubs 7th Fleet.

0622 Rounded Sekala Island.

0715 Submerged on sighting single plane (ZEKE) at about 10 miles flying low.

0750 Surfaced and sighted same plane again.

0751 Submerged to avoid detection.

0814 Surfaced and went to 4 engine speed.

Submerged on SD contact and sight contact at 15 miles on float plane, circling (RWE).

1245 IT sound reports possible screws bearing 238° T. Nothing visible with 15 feet of periscope exposed.

1300 Exposed 15 feet of periscope and sighted masts bearing 235° T. Commenced approach. Ships consist of a small freighter type escort and a small engines aft freighter, "Sugar Charlie" type. Started approach on escort because his higher superstructure made him appear larger.

Near firing point a zig away gave us a 3,000 yard shot at the escort and placed us almost on track of SC. At this point considered shifting targets but did not for the following reasons:

(1) Chance of getting both targets by torpedo fire.

(2) Escort has gun mounted forward (about 37mm).

(3) If we get the escort with torpedoes, we can get the other ship with gun fire.

(4) Setup checking perfectly on escort.

1339:30 Fired three Mk 18-1 torpedoes at escort. Depth set 4 feet, track 105 5, torpedo run 3,200 yards. Missed. Following the above clumsy attack, stood clear to the South and conducted special mission, as assigned by Comsubs Seventh Fleet. See Supplement "A" to this report.

21 May (8) Noon: Lat. 05-49 S Long. 115-13 E.

Patrolling North of Kangean Island enroute assigned area.

SJ contact 18,000 yards 180° T, bearing drawing left.

Target on base course 085° T at varying speeds. While tracking we are keeping the range open to 12,500 - 14,000 yards for the following reasons:

(1) Target is headed towards vicinity of our last attack

and is probably an escort vessel.

(2) On our last patrol we were detected twice while tracking when range was allowed to close to 10,000

(3) Target changing speed about every 20 minutes (15,11,8, 17,13 kts).

(4) Track and antics of target indicates that he knows we have been around and is on the alert for us.

We are taking quick SJ setups at 2 minute intervals. Between looks we sweep with the PPI by keying; but cut it off as it crosses the target's sector each time.

Submerged 13,000 yards ahead of target, 1,000 yards off the track. Tracked target in from 10,000 yards using ST ranges and JT sound bearings. (The ST-JT is an excellent combination for tracking a single target submerged at night). At 4,000 yards can barely make out target through periscope. Target has zero angle on bow but is almost due for a zig away. Resping our bow on target to reduce his chances of sound contact. He is echo ranging on 17.4 kc.

O247 Zig away as expected. Target is a blob in periscope but has general contour of a DE or AM. Moon has just set. Sound bearings by JT considered more accurate than periscope, so continued to use them with ST ranges.

0248:30 Fired 5 terpedoes, 700 foot spread, depth set 4 and 5 feet

One torpedo explosion (timed hit). By this time "Cautious Cassius" was conning the CHUB at 200 feet. Sound reports 0251 42 that screws and echo ranging have stopped. Started to

return to periscope depth.

Heavy explosion that sounded as if block buster had been 0255:45 dropped on us. Immediate reaction of all hands was that we had nicked the target with one torpedo, but that he was still able to drop depth charges. Careful check by sound reveals nothing. Decided that target had exploded instead of depth charging us.

0310 Started easing up to periscope depth.

0342 Careful sweeps on ST and SJ show all clear.

0344 Surfaced and closed scene of attack.

Passed through large strong smelling oil slick. Circled 0405 area but could locate no survivors in the dark. Consider target sunk. As a crippled target could not have gotten beyond SJ range without making screw noises that could be heard by our JT.

0413 Set course for our assigned area. In retrospect the C.O. feels a little sheepish about not staying at periscope depth after firing at this unescorted DE or AM; but gives the following reasons:

(1) Target recognized to be an escort vessel and known to be alert; as we attacked him within 4 miles of the point

of our previous afternoon's attack.

Tack of complete confidence in sound shots.

Inability to tell by eye what the target was doing. (4) A natural pessimism born of experience on several boats of having heard many torpedoes leave the tube; but very few explosions, except prematures.

(5) A great deal of respect for this type of target.

0700 Sent serial two to Comsubs 7th Fleet.

0708 Submerged to get some rest.

1620 Surfaced. Set course for area at 3 engine speed.

Noon: Let. 04-46 S Long. 113-13 E.

Entered assigned area. During day patrolled near Southern **VIO** area boundary on line between Schangan Bay and Socrabaja, at 2 engine speed.

Exchanged calls with CROAKER via SJ.

Long. 111-33 E. Noon: Lat. 04-39 S

Patrolling line Southwest of Sebangan Bay.

O345 Sounding 13 fathoms. Set course to open out to deeper water before daylight. Two engine speed.

0957 Submerged to work on SJ radar.

1442 Surfaced. Radar back in commission.
1520 Blew gasket in hydraulic accumulator.

1529 Submerged to renew gasket, rather than chance a forced dive without hydraulic power.

1637 Surfaced. During night patrolled Southwest and South of Sebangan Bay at 3 engine speed.

Noon: Let. 04-46 S Long. 112-57 E.

0851 Submerged on line North of Bawean Island.

1934 Surfaced. Received report from BOARFISH of having sighted 3 small ferries and 1 patrol boat during afternoon.

2245 SJ radar out of commission.

Headed Southeast at 3 knots while BOARFISH came close aboard. Passed instructions to BOARFISH via line throwing gun for coordinated patrol of this area.

Noon: Lat. 04-42 S Long. 112-41 E.

OO12 Set course to overtake ferries and patrol boat; although BOARFISH advised that entire outfit didn't aggregate 600 tons and that she had made no attack on them.

Changed mind and reversed source for following response.

Changed mind and reversed course for following reasons:
(1) Plot shows we will have to go 60 miles inside the

BLUEBACK and GROAKER area to overtake.

(2) Radar officer states that many hours will be required

to repair SJ - if it can be repaired.

Decided not to enter another boat's area with no SJ.

Submerged on line North of Bawean Island. BOARFISH is
Southeast of us submerged on line between Bawean and Cape
Malatajoer.

Worked on SJ radar all day. A 1700 volt transformer is burned out in the "A" scope unit and there is no spare on our allowance. The radar gang has hooked up a "jury-rig" consisting of a 2000 volt transformer found in SD spares and an assortment of resistors taken from the QC and QB sound equipment. Everyone has his fingers crossed and is wondering, when we surfaced, whether the SJ will send out a "ping" or "pulse".

1934 Surfaced. The SJ sends out pulses.

26 May (13)
Noon: Let. 03-53 S Long. 111-16 E.

Patrolling close inshore off Cape Poeting to cover possible traffic along South Coast of Borneo, to and from Banka Strait.

0155 False alarm on APR, 125 megs. Fathometer reading 4 fathoms, started opening out from coast. Leter found that APR had sub-harmonic of ST radar which was being tested at this time.

During day patrolled on surface Southwest of Cape Poeting. SJ radar out for four hours during the day.

1945 Set course to close coast and investigate the vicinity of Sangora Bank for possible anchored ships.

2312 Crossed inside the 10 fathom curve.

0123

0720

1829

27 May (14) Lat. 03-42 S Long. 11-38 E.

Patrolling South of Koemai Bay in 8 fathoms of water. making radar search for possible anchored shipping. Crossed outside 10 fathom curve and patrolled Southwest of Cape Poeting in 18 fathoms of water. Submerged. Moved North 42 miles and conducted submerged patrol off Cape Poeting in 16 fathoms of water. Surfaced and notified BLENNY of our position.

28 May (15) Noon: Lat. 04-17 S Long. 112-41 E.

0328 Made rendezvous with BLENNY and communicated by VHF. Exchanged ideas and plans for working this shallow water area. Plans are as follows: Tonight both boats will make a search for anchored targets. BLENNY will work up towards mouth of Barito River and CHUB will work up towards. Sebangan Bay. Both spots have a narrow tongue of fairly decent water 11 to 15 fathoms leading up to within a few miles of the objectives. If either boat stirs up a hornet's nest, she will pull clear and advise the other boate 0930 Submerged in 19 fathoms of water heading up towards Sobangan

Bay, 75 miles away.

1947 Surfaced in 13 fathoms of water; continued working up towards Sebangan Bay and Cape Malatajoer. The bottom is very uneven in this tongue, varying from 11 to 15 fathoms. 2200 Crossed an 18 fathous pocket not shown on the chart.

2236 Came to an apparent uncharted bank where fathometer readings dropped rapidly from 9 to 6 to 42 fathoms. (We are trimmed down to 21 feet, giving depth of water as 8 fathoms where chart shows 12 to 15).

2310 Circling to the left while Navigator finishes another set of moonlight stars. Fix shows us within one mile of DR position and in charted depth of 15 fathoms.

Became suspicious of fathometer. Stopped and broke out the lead line. The lead fell off on the first cast. (The line was rotten from being stowed topside).

2353 Made stationary dive to check fathometer sounding of 4 fathoms. Settled on the bottom at 45 feet, showing that fathometer is accurate.

Noon: Lat. 04-30 S Long. 111-31 E.

Surfaced. Made 4 mile dog leg off to the left at slow speed in hopes of locating a deep channel. Fathometer readings 4 or 42 fathoms all the way.

Oll4 Abandoned idea of reaching bay and set course to open out for following reasons:

(1) Navigation has been accurate. Checked by 3 fixes.
(2) In no place has fathometer checked with charted sound-

ings.
(3) Believe Malatajoer Bank, which extends 40 miles to

seaward has expanded during the past 38 years.

(4) Full moon with overcast sky. Time not best for this type of reconnaissance.

Fathometer readings increased to 6 fathoms, went to stand-

Ol27 Fathometer readings increased to 6 fathoms, went to standard speed. Patrolled well off shore during the day. 1800 Set course to close Cape Poeting.

30 May (17) Noon: Let. 04-34 S Long. 112-56 E.

0122 Crossed inside 10 fathom curve to make radar search for pos-

sible anchored targets. Trimmed down.

Grossed outside 10 fathom curve and set course for rende

O305 Crossed outside 10 fathom curve and set course for rendezvous with BLENNY at 3 engine speed.

Received word from BLENNY that she was closing small AK for attack, and cancelling rendervous.

1107 Altered course to the South. (See Supplement "A").

2010 Lost high voltage on SJ radar. Shortly thereafter detected strong SJ interference Southwest of us, closing, believed to be CROAKER. Then SJ failed completely.

Went to full speed on 3 engines, course North, and notified BLENNY and CROAKER that our SJ was out. CROAKER asked our position. Gave it to him and asked him to stop chasing us. CROAKER replied that he was searching for convoy East of us. We continued to run along blind as a bat. Soon received message from CROAKER, "Attacking Starboard Flank". We wonder uneasily what was our relative position to the fray. Later learned that CROAKER attacked South of us. We must have gone directly across the bow of his convoy, within a few thousand yards.

31 May (18) Noon: Lat. 04-50 S Long. 113-21 E.

Patrolling blindly East and West with the war apparently going on all around us. Received contact report from BLENNY giving position and course and asking if he was tracking us. Told him negative, fire when ready. It would have saved us a couple of hours of uneasiness if the CROAKER had told us what and where she was attacking, without our having to ask twice.

0206 SJ radar back in commission, too late for the show, but quite a relief to see in the dark again. APA now out of commission.

APR back in commission. 0721

0738 Closed BIENNY to communicate by VHF. Making plans for the day. Decided to head East and rendezvous again at dark West of the Laurot Islands.

Rendezvous completed. Went to 3 engine speed, headed East. Numerous sailboats sighted during the day. 0816

1920 Closed BLEWNY at Eastern area boundary for VHF conference. Plan is as follows: We will do a little poaching on the adjoining area, making reconnaissance of the Laurot Island Croup, with BIKNNY working the North side and CHUB working the South side. At moonrise we will meet at the East end of Mata Siri Island and take a look into the small bey anchorage there. If we find anything anchored, we will pull clear and flip a coin to see who shoots. The winner will back in close, trimmed down, and fire stern tubes into the anchorage.

2010 Completed conference and commenced reconnaissance.

2220 Closing Mata Siri Island and getting strong SJ interference.

Wondering how BLENNY's interference carries so far.

2240 Challenged and exchanged calls with HMS TIPTOE, who is also making survey of Mata Siri. My schedule shows him to be patrolling South of Lat. 7 South. Started working around TIPTOE for look at anchorage.

2300 SJ radar went out of commission again. Pulled clear and sent message to BLENNY and TIPTOE.

2315 Contact report from BLENNY. She has flushed a small AK with escort and is herding them over into our area.

2317 Went to 4 engine speed and set course to work around islands and get on projected track. Hope we can get SJ to working by then.

> Have message from Comfaskfor 71 changing our area to E-2. Plan to assist BLENNY with this contact, then shift areas.

1 June (19) Noon: Let. 4-55 S Tong. 114-57 E.

BIENNY reports results of her attack negative.

O039 SJ radar back in commission except we have no PPI and no lobing.

O219 Getting weak SJ interference from TIPTOE who apparently cut between the islands. We couldn't do this for fear she might take a shot at us.

0305 On projected track, 80 contact 2 minutes later, 14,000 yards.

Received report from BLENNY that they had expended 14 torpedoes with negative results and that the C.O.'s face was red. Notified BLENNY and TIPTCE that we were starting approach. No receipt from TIPTCE.

Tracked from shead for one hour. Since BLENNY had had bad luck with this target, decided to take our time. Later decided to attack from the quarter. Did reverse end around and took station 3,000 yards on target's port quarter, with escort 1,000 yards on target's starboard bow. Took up formation speed, 9.5 kts., waiting for a zig toward. Half moon now 4 hours high but visibility poor due to complete overcast and intermittent rain squalls.

21g toward, range 2,400 yards. Opened outer doors preparatory to shooting but was not satisfied with set-up, which gave a 3,000 yard rum. Decided to rum with them a while longer and try to ease in a little closer, since there has been no indication of detection. Expect a more favorable zig at 0500. Eased in to 2,000 yards on quarter. Torpedo rum will be down sea.

7500 Zig towards. Target and ascort ever lapping.

Fired 3 Mk 18-1 torpedoes, depth 4 feet, range 1,450, torpedo run 1,875, track 144 P, spread 300 feet; TET bearings, Radar ranges. Swung left and away at flank speed. No hits.

Decided against further expenditure of torpedoes. Reasons:

(1) Our three made a total of 17 that had been fired at this group in about 5 hours. (2) We know that the BLENNY has a very good fire control party.

2500 EJ interference to North, believed to be BLENNY or TIFFOE.

No answer to challenge.

527 SJ contact 7,000 yards with SJ interference. No answer to challenge.

4537 Contact closing fast. Swung left, went to flank speed.
Closest range 3,200 yards. Believed this to be friendly
sub taking no chances on it being the PC escort. Shortly
afterwards received message from BLENNY to slow for VHF
conference.

Took Southeasterly course while she closed to pass us some much needed radar spares, and for the C.O.'s to hold sympathy conference.

626 BIENNY reports SJ contact at 16,000 yards. Spares not yet transferred. They have no torpedoes. We will take crack

- at it and transfer spares afterwards.

 Pulled clear and started tracking 2 targets on base course
 090 speed 7 kts. Too late for a night attack and too early
 for submerged attack. Moreover the nearest soundings on
 the chart are 16 fathoms North and 13 fathoms west of our
 DR position. Will run with the target to give 13 fathom
 spot good clearance.
- Submerged 13,000 yards ahead on target's starboard bow.
 Identified target as a small freighter passenger type, about 1,200 tons, with stack aft, bridge amidships; escorted by an SCS-51 sub chaser, or PC. Escort on starboard bow of target. Came to 90 track to pull across bow and attack from port flank. Used ST ranges from 9,000 yards in to 4,100 yds, then shifted to stadimeter ranges with 76 foot masthead height. As escort approached, put stern on him and altered course slowly left as he crossed astern at 600 yards, at which point we were dead ahead of target at 3,000 yards. With escort clear, used 75 turns to get on across target's track and ended up farther across than intended. Target has been zigging only 15 degrees at odd, long intervals.
- O805 Fired 3 Mc 14 torpedoes from stern tubes, depth 6 feet, torpedo run 1,400, track 82 P, gyros near zero. Watched torpedo track run straight and normal. No hits.

Target did not start turning away until after torpedoes had passed under her. Started taking quick looks at escort and target while putting stern to escort. He is not alerted yet. Have false target shell ready.

- O813 Escort is headed our way, belching black smoke. Fired false target shell, followed by a noisemaker (NAC), then another false target shell. Rigged in sound heads and pit log.

 Eased down to 90 feet and started pulling away at 80 turns on Westerly course.
- 0822 Altered course to 240° T as Westerly course heads us towards 13 fathoms and we are not sure of our DR position.

Cannot hear escort's screws because of noisemaker. Can hear his intermittent pinging. Eased experimentally from 90 ft to 95 then to 100 ft. No depth charges yet. Escort must be fascinated by NAC beacon, or maybe he is dropping contact projectiles, that have been rumored in other patrol reports.

- Returned to periscope depth and slowed to 60 turns. Observed escort milling around in vicinity of false targets 3,000 to 4,000 yards away.
- 0852 Escort gives a belch of smoke and lays down a pattern of 10

- depth charges, then starts milling around again.

 10918 Escort drops another pattern of 5 depth charges. We are now 7,000 yards away easing out to Southwest.
- 0950 Heavy rain squall sets in. Decided to surface and stand clear.
- O953 Surfaced on Westerly course and sent to BLENNY results negative as usual. No receipt.
- 0957 Rain squall passed West of us leaving escort plainly visible. Started chasing the rain squall, 4 engine speed.
- 1005
 SJ radar out of commission again.

 Overtook rain squall and visibility decreased to 500 yards.

 Sent message twice more including dope on radar and request-
- ing rendezvous. She is apparently still submerged.

 Submerged. Everyone is tired and SJ is out. Will rest up
- Submerged. Everyone is tired and SJ is out. Will rest up today and rendezvous tonight, then head for new area.

 1720
 SJ radar back in commission, "A" scope only.

 Surfaced and requested the BLENNY to rendezvous.
- 2100 Received BLENNY message, tracking and investigating unidentified enemy on base course 230 speed 13. Position 70 miles
- West of us. She is out of terpedces but still doesn't want to go home.

 2103

 Took intercept course at full speed on 3 engines.
- 2103 Took intercept course at full speed on 3 engines.
 2157 Report from BLENNY that enemy is PC, now on course 215 at 14 knots. We cannot intercept. Headed for rendezvous point designated.
- 2300 Message from 3TF 71 assigning us lifeguard station off of Batavia for the 3rd.
- Slowed while BLENNY came close aboard and passed radar spares.

 Received following information:
 - (1) BLENNY watched our morning attack, while submerged 3 miles North of us, and tracked our torpedoes by sound as running straight.
 - (2) PC did not rejoin AK after counter attacking us.
 - (3) She later attempted end around on same FC and observed FBM circling it (The one the Zoomies later reported as a Wakatake DD).
 - (4) BLENNY sighted float plane over scene of our attack later in morning. Not seen by us.
 - (5) She surfaced at 1210; accounting for nonreception of our messages.
- 2355 APR contact 134 megs. Neither BLENNY nor CHUB know what this may be, unless it it the TIFFOE with other radar in addition to her SJ.

Noon: Lat. 4-59 S Long. 112-23 E.

Completed rendezvous and sympathy session and bid the BLENNY farewell. Hope we can work with them again. We didn't give the Nips much trouble, but it was an active whirl and we had lots of fun.

0054 Set course for new area 3 engine speed.

Made 15 minute trim dive and flushed out No. 3 FBT which had been converted during rendezvous.

Sent serial three to CTF 71 revealing the red faced accomplishmets of the BLENNY-CHUB sheep pack.

3 June (21) Noon: Lat. 5-40 S Long. 106-47 E.

O910 Submerged East of Thousand Islands. Made "U" turn around South Watcher and opened out towards lifeguard station.

Many sailboats in sight during day.

2025 Surfaced 7 miles Northeast of South Watcher.

2040 BLUEBACK came close aboard and passed us instructions for coordinated patrol, and chart showing traffic routes across Sunda Strait.

On station for lifeguard duty. Several radar contacts on planes. Planes showed running lights until formed up.

During raid observed several bomb blasts in direction of Batavia.

2350 Received word that all planes were away and clear.

Noon: Let. 5-49 S Long. 105-53 E.

Occurse to pass North of Thousand Islands. Intermittent interference from BLUEBACK all night.

Occurse to pass North of Thousand Islands. Intermittent interference from BLUEBACK all night.

Occupancy of the street of Northern approaches to Sunda Strait. BLUEBACK patrolling Eastern half. During day observed small craft, built like lugger, and smoking profusely, running between Toppers Island and Whartway Island.

land. On Northern leg he would go behind Toppers Island but not stand past. Half hour later he would stand out on reverse course toward Whartway. Antics of a patrol vessel.

Surfaced and exchanged calls with BLUEBACK and discussed plans for next day's patrol.

During night patrolled Northeast of St. Nicholas Point.

Many contacts with sailboats and unidentified small craft.

Some not picked up on SJ until 2,500 yards.

5 June (23)
Noon: Let. 5-44 S Long. 106-26 E.

O725 Submerged 6 miles North of Babi Island and moved over to patrol Northwest of Hoorn Island. Sea has fair ripple but no white caps.

1028 JT sound reports possible high speed screws bearing 000° T.

Nothing visible with 8 feet of periscope.

1033 Went to battle stations. Still nothing in sight.

Sighted tops of ship bearing 012° T, over 24,000 yards, angle 15 starboard, later identified as HAGURO class heavy cruiser, with MINEKAZE class DD escort and at least two float planes and two BETTY bombers for air cover.

Cruiser is zigging between 180° and 205° at about 5 minute intervals, tracking at 21.5 knots, 250 rpm.

Range 9,200, angle on bow 18 starboard. Went to 75 feet and came to a 60 track.

1106 Came up expecting a zig toward but observed large zig away,

range 5,500, angle on bow 60 starboard.

DD has zero angle on bow, CA about 75 starboard.

Next look DD has 20 port angle on bow, and on following look DD is turning away. DD made complete circle to his right then bent on a lot of speed to catch up with cruiser.

Remained at periscope depth and watched this valuable target pass by outside the range of our Mk 18 torpedoes.

Observed splash in water close aboard while making low power sweep. Ordered down scope, 90 feet, flood negative.

Heard bombs arm. C.O. was already heckling the Diving Officer by the time two plane bombs exploded close aboard, as we passed 70 feet. Reversed course and started opening out to better water at 100 rpm. Heard several distant explosions during ensuing hour.

2046 Surfaced and set course to pass North of Thousand Islands.

Commentary on Observations:

(1) Believe that large zig away was scheduled zig to round Mundi Reef and pass East of Hoorn Island instead of West of Hoorn as we had expected. Had first believed the zig indicated detection, but we were not bombed until 16 minutes later.

(2) The zero angle on the bow by the DD at first indicated detection, but completion of his circle indicated that he was possibly loosing bearing from CA's bow to quarter to allow for a large zig toward. On other hand it is possible that DD may have been starting rum on us and been called back by cruiser to take care of what might lay ahead.

(3) Final positive detection and consequent bombing was

results of foolishly remaining at periscope depth for 16 minutes in vicinity of 4 plane air coverage.

Noon: Let. 5-40 S Long. 106-46 E.

- Oioo Exchanged calls, information and ideas with BLUEBACK. Both believe CA is in Batavia for short stay only. Both believe he will follow different route on his return trip; as a cruiser of this class has been sighted on 3 different routes in and out of Batavia by a Dutch submarine. Today we will patrol East of Thousand Islands.
- SJ contact 3,200 yards on same bearing as BLUEBACK interference. (SJ had been in use for some time for communications). Believed this contact to be BLUEBACK and that range had closed during SJ communication. Allowed range to close to 2,500 making sight contact. This craft began to flash blinker signals at us, and we, still believing it BLUEBACK, flashed back. After considerable exchange of unintelligible blinking, while range closed to 1,900; recognized contact as a patrol boat definitely not a submarine. Stood clear at flank speed.
- 0729 Submerged and patrolled East of Thousand Islands in vicinity of South Watcher. QB sound head off 200 in bearings.
- 2035 Surfaced and set course to pass North of Islands. 2310 Exchanged calls, ideas, and plans with BLUEBACK.

7 June (25) Noon: Lat. 5-44 S Long. 106-19 E.

- O718 Submerged North of Bahi Island and moved over to patrol off Western tip of Hoorn Island. Sea is flat with barely a ripple on the water.
- Sighted float <u>plane</u> bearing 115° T and another float <u>plane</u> bearing 080° T.
- 1015 JT sound picked up possible high speed screws partially blanketed by the reef noises of Hoorn Island.
- Propeller noise definite bearing East and drawing left.

 Sighted heavy cruiser hull down, bearing 067° T. Range
 by height of eye formula 18,000 yards, which puts him almost on Great Kotok Island, in the Thousand Island Group.

 Turn count 280 rpm, 24 knots. He disappeared from sight
 shortly, hugging the Thousand Islands. About 15 minutes
 later he slowed to 220 rpm, 19 knots. JT sound tracked
 him out to an estimated range of 40,000 yards.

Commentary: (1) We were outguessed on cruiser's return trip. Krowl-

edge that cruiser of this class had been seen by a Dutch submarine on three different routes in and out of Batavia led C.O. to believe that he would follow different route out, especially since we had been detected near his track inbound. Instead the CA used the same return route, hugged the islands closer and added 2.5 knots speed until clear of expected attack area.

1316 Sighted two small Sugar Dogs or Sugar Charlies South of Babi Island on Westerly course. Tracked their smoke into Banteen Bay.

1/27 Sighted float plane headed towards Batavia.

1444 Sighted small patrol boat in direction of Banteen Bay.

2029 Surfaced North of Cape St. Nicholas.

During night patrolled off West Island until we were completely boxed in by sailboats and other unidentified craft, then shifted to patrol North of Cape St. Nicholas.

8 June (26)
Noon: Lat. 5-49 S Long. 105-53 E.

0025 Exchanged calls with the BLUEBACK.

'0038 Passed North Watcher. Making sweep for possible targets

in shallow water North of North Watcher.

O215 Reversed course to head back for diving area. Steering various courses to clear the various reefs and numerous sailboats.

0625 Went to 4 engine speed to reach desired diving position.

O716 Submerged for patrol of West half of Sunda Strait.

BLUEBACK patrolling East side. Slight ripple on the water during the morning changing to a glassy calm in the afternoon. During the day sighted 2 Sugar Dogs and one Sub Chaser crossing Strait well South of us.

2036 Surfaced and exchanged calls with the BLUEBACK.

2210 Headed South, planning to make radar search of Banteen
Bay for possible anchored targets.

9 June (27) Noon: Let. 5-45 S Long. 105-57 E.

0007 West side of bay apparently empty. Headed East to check

Eastern half of bay.

OO17 Challenged by blinker light sharp on port bow. Cannot see craft and radar gets no contact. Turned away flank, as light continued to blink at us, and opened out to Northward. Will not try searches of this nature again until the sensitivity of our radar is improved to where

oo46 Slowed to exchange calls with BLUEBACK. Learned that she is departing area. We will miss her continual and confusing radar interference through-out the coming nights.

During remainder of night patrolled North of St. Nicholas Point.

O720 Submerged for patrol off Sunda Strait. During day sighted 6 small luggers and one sub chaser all close inshore and none suitable as torpedo targets. Luggers and small Sugar Dogs sighted in Sunda Strait have not been attacked by gun fire for following reasons:

(1) Have no specific directives relative to the present of

projected strategic value of this strait.

(2) Question the advisability of possibly creating a hornet's nest in a narrow strait that is being used with increasing frequency for submarine transit.

(3) See supplement "A" for additional comment relative to

small craft contacts in Sunda Strait.

2047 Surfaced. Set course to pass North of Thousand Islands.

10 June (28) Noon: Lat. 5-22 S Long. 107-37.5 E.

Patrolled on surface during the day on line between Indramurya Point and Banka Strait.

O940 Submerged on SD contacts 10 and 19 miles followed by sight contact on one 2 engine bember, bearing South.
Changed course to South.

1115 Surfaced and resumed patrol.

1800 Set course to make sweep North of Thousand Islands.

11 June (29) Noon: Lat. 5-50 S Long. 105-52 E.

O721 Submerged in Northern entrance to Sunda Strait. Decided to work well down into the strait today and get on probable track of the small Sugar Dog traffic.

1036 JT sound reported heavy screws bearing Northeast. drawing

JT sound reported heavy screws bearing Northeast, drawing left. Nothing in sight. Looks as if some worthwhile target is crossing Northern approaches to strait on the one day we choose to patrol farther South than normal.

During the day the sea was fairly choppy with scattered white caps, the first we have seen West of the Thousand Islands. This was caused by a fresh breeze setting in from the Southwest through Sunda Strait. Normally the prevailing wind (East Monsoon) is from the Southeast, and is partially blanked out by the Java Coast and the Thousand Islands.

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COMPTITEMPT AT.	- II S.S.	OHIR (SS	3 429)	SECOND WAR	PATROL REPORT:
	V 10-10-1	A4400 /			

2043 Surfaced.
2145 Passed small craft abeam to port. Radar finally picked it up at 1,200 yards.

Noon: Lat. 5-43 S Long. 106-28 E.

Submerged 5 miles North of Babi Island and moved over to patrol West of Thousand Islands, 3 miles off Mungu Island.

Sighted smoke bearing 190° T, Southwest of Hoorn Island.
Unable to close! Smoke passed South of Babi Island, apparently headed towards Banteen Bay.

Headed back up to patrol West of Thousand Islands.

1417 Headed back up to patrol West of Thousand Islands.
2045 Surfaced 10 miles West of West Island. Set course to make a sweep in the shallow water North of North Watcher.
2300 Passed North Watcher Island.

13 June (31) Noon: Lat. 5-34 S Long. 106-16 E.

Reversed course and headed down for diving area. Will have to dive West of West Island today as insufficient time remains to reach point farther South before daylight.

Submerged and patrolled 8.5 to 4.5 miles Southwest of West Island, in 21 to 18 fathoms of water. See has fair chop today, but no white caps.

Sighted lugger bearing 060° T and smoke bearing 020° T.

Bearing on smoke drawing left. Chased this smoke on normal approach courses remainder of afternoon. Sighted float plane air coverage, but no masts. Bearing of smoke drew from 020° T over to 330° T by night fall. Two columns of smoke sighted. Ships were either Southbound and cutting across Southwest from North Watcher to run along Sumetra coast; or they were Northbound and had come up East side of Thousand Islands and were cutting across Northwest towards Brothers Islands.

2038 Surfaced and made 10 mile dog leg to West to cover possibility that ships were headed Southwest. Closed coast to investigate pip, which finally blended in with shore line at 15,000 yards.

2140 Stood out from coast and set course to search to North of North Watcher Island. Three engine speed.

14 June (32) Noon: Lat. 4-52 S Long. 107-30 E.

O220 Passed North Watcher Island, making search to Northward.
Radar officer reports that SJ is acting up and fluctuating

due to bed magnetron tube, causing double moding of transmitter, with blank spots in PPI sweep coverage. Abandoned search and reversed course for following reasons:

(1) SJ radar is erratic and unreliable and the sensitivity

is definitely low.

(2) At least 3 engine speed will be required to reach desired diving area, allowing a margin of time for dodging the small contacts we will encounter on the way.

Went to 4 engine speed. Have 40 miles to go to North Watcher plus an additional 20 miles to our desired diving spot.

O339 SJ contact bearing 199° T, range 10,100 yards. Commenced tracking target and deliberated as to whether there was time available to attack and get clear. Decided that we would not have time to attack and still reach suitable diving water South of North Watcher, allowing time for dodging sailboats, reefs and possible patrol craft. Decided that we could attack and pull clear to East, provided we attacked before 0500 and made flank speed retirement to East.

0400 Manned battle stations. Target tracking on course 030°, speed 5 knots, visible from bridge at 7,000 yards. Night clear with no moon. Decided to attack from starboard quarter, where we would have a cloudy background.

Target now on course 045° T. At 4,500 yards can make out 3 additional targets, much smaller than main target. On radar the target group was just one blended pip that did not begin to break up into separate pips until range had closed to 4,000 yards. We then shifted to TBT bearings and radar ranges.

O436 Commenced firing 5 Mk 18-1 torpodoes. Range 2,400, torpedo rum 2,650, track 144 S, depth setting staggered 2,3, and 4 feet. Binocular formula gave ship length of about 200 feet.

O437:15 Observed, heard, and felt a double explosion (few seconds apart). Which blanked off main target. The port after lookout, who was keeping target under constant surveillance reported that he could no longer make out target shortly after the explosion. Radar reported that explosion was observed on PPI, giving appearance of rain cloud. Shortly afterwards radar reported only two pips which soon blended into one as they had during the initial tracking phase.

O451 Steadied up on Easterly course at flank speed, 19 knots, sound head raised and all ballast tanks dry. The water

we are running in varies between 12 and 14 fathoms. We have about 50 miles to go from point of attack to get across a 12 fathom bank; beyond which the water drops off rapidly to 18, 19, and 20 fathoms. In case we are caught short there is a 15 to 16 fathoms pocket 38 miles along the way.

- 0612 SJ contact on port bow 5,600 yards. Avoided. During the hour SJ picked up two more contacts at ranges of 5,400 and 6,000, which were also avoided.
- 0720 By DR we are crossing the 12 fathom bank and should soon be in decent water.
- 0740 Slowed to standard speed on 4 engines.
- 0747 Sighted cross-tree mast and bridge of sub chaser broad on starboard bow.
- O748 Submerged, being careful to use very little dewn angle.
 Loveled off at 80 feet.
- O800 Returned to periscope depth and observed the sub chaser.

 He appears to be lying to or kicking ahead slowly on a .

 Northwesterly course, judging by change of bearing.
- 0804 Altered course slightly left and went to 90 feet. Diving officer found that boat leveled off nicely at 87½ feet and that by flooding in water he got down to 88 feet. He thought that he was running on a layer (which was true) and made no report of it.
- Oslo Ordered periscope depth for another look.
 Oslo Diving officer requested more speed, stating that he was having trouble getting up. Shortly after increase in speed found that we were swinging right with left 20 degrees rudder, and that diving officer was getting no up angle with hard rise on both planes. Realized that we were in the mud. Worked out of mud by pumping and kicking ahead slowly.
- Bearing of sub chaser slowly drawing to South. We stood clear on course 075° T, running 75 turns at 75 feet between looks. Suspect that this craft may have been stationed there to intercept us. Can think of no other logical reason for a patrol craft to be milling around so far from shore all by himself.
- 2011 Surfaced in Eastern edge of our area.

 2055 Sent serial 5 to CTF 71, reporting our attack, adding that we had two steam torpedoes remaining aft, and asking whether we should depart area or remain. Message was cleared through Darwin and proper authentication received. (Later learned that message was not received by Subic)

Noon: Lat. 5-46 S L Long. 106-41 E.

0200 Set course for South Watcher Island. Have received to answer to our message. Will remain in area as we may get lifeguard assignment.

0726 Submerged 9 miles East of South Watcher Island. Patrolled Southeast of Thousand Islands, between South Watcher Island and the Agenieten Islands. Closed Jong Reef to 3,000 yards then worked back up between South Watcher and the Thousand Islands.

2041 Surfaced 7 miles Northeast of South Watcher. 2312 Set course to close coastline for night patrol.

> 16 June (34) Noon: Let. 4-21 S Long. 108-37 E.

0300 Set course North to open out from coast. We are scheduled to arrive Subic 22 June, which would necessitate departing area tonight and running submerged in Karimata Strait tonorrow. Decided to depart area this norning for following reasons:

(1) Have only two Mk 14 torpodoes, which are aft.
(2) By departing area half a day early we can run surface through Karimata tonight and gain a full day, and arrive Subic 21 June.

Sent serial 6 notifying CTF 71 that we were departing area half day early. Received message that CTF 71 had not received our serial 5.

0900 Departed area and set course for Karimata Strait. 1435 Submerged Southwest of Discovery East Bank Light. 1901 Sighted friendly submarine on Southerly course. 1941 Surfaced and commenced transit of Karimata Strait. two friendly submarines.

> 17 June (35) Noon: Lat. 0-06 S Long. 107-00 E.

0305 Cleared Karimata Strait. SJ out for 2 hours during the day.

18-20 June (36-38)

Enroute Subic Bay P.I., conducting training and school of the boat. Fired all guns. Made deep dive to test for leaks prior to refit. Sighted several friendly planes.

21 June (39)

0455 Made rendezvous with escort, U.S.S. FRATT (DE 363). 1000 Arrived Subic Bay, P.I.

(C) WEATHER

Weather encountered South of Borneo was as per sailing directions. However, off Northwest Java and Sunda Strait the sailing directions state "the Eastern Moonsoon blows with force from East-Southeast between the latter half of April and October, being strongest in June, July, and August". This wind was negligible.

(D) TIDAL INFORMATION

Currents held closely to these indicated on various H.O. charts and sailing directions. A current of 4 knots, 150° T. Set was experienced off the Southern entrance to Lombok Strait on 19 May.

(E) NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

A sweep into the Sabangan Bay area off the Southern coast of Borneo revealed a bar to have formed around the vicinity of 113°-15', 03°-40'. Fathometer readings in water where the chart showed 11 to 15 fathoms indicated the water to average about 7½ fathoms. To check fathometer we submerged and hit bettom at 45'. Our position was checked as accurate by three NAVIGATIONAL FIXES.

Cross bearings in the Thousand Island Group were fairly accurate. However, distortion was noticed on certain bearings between other islands, such as South Watcher, Babi, and Agenieten taken in conjunction with the Thousand Islands.

Cross bearings in the Sunda Strait area were accurate with the exception of North Island on the East coast of Sumatra. This island is apparently slightly misplaced on the chart.

(F) SHIP CONTACTS

No		Let. Long.	Type(s)	Initial Range	Est. Course Speed	How con- tacted	
1,		06-18 S 116-05 E	1 Small AK 1 Escort	20,000 yds	020 ⁰ T 9 kts	JP Sound	Subject of Spec. Report
2.		06-09 S 1 115-36 E		18,000 yds	105 ⁰ T 13 kts	SJ Radar	Sunk
3.		05-08 S 113-56 E	2 Coasters 1 Sub Chaser 1 Converted Escort		025 [°] T 4 kts	JP Sound	Subject of Spec. Report
4.	0307I 6-1	04 -41 S 115-14 E	1 Small AK 1 PC Escort	14,000 yds	240° T 9.5 kts	SJ Radar	Missed Surf. Attack
5.	06261 6-1	04-52 S 115-14 E	1 Small AK 1 PC Escort	13,800 yds	070 ⁰ T 7 kts		Sub. Attack Torp. seen to run under.
6,		106-26 E	1 Haguro Cl. Cruiser 1 Minekaze Class DD	35,000 yds	190° T 21.5 kts	JP Sound	Detected and bombed during approach, target zigged away.
7.	1015I 6-7	106-22 E	1 Haguro Cl. Cruiser 1 Minekaze Class DD	18,000 yds	305 ⁰ T 24 kts		Could not close.
8.		04 - 49 S 106 - 20 E	4 Small Un- : idents	10,100 yds	050 ⁰ T 4.5 kts	SJ Radar	Sank Largest.
9•	0747I 6-14		l Sub Chaser	18,000 yds	315 ⁰ T 5 kts	Visual from brid	Dove to Avoid. ge.

Many Luggers, Sea Trucks and small patrol boats were seen in area Easy Two in vicinity Sunda Strait. For more information concerning these see Supplement "A" to this report.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR TARGETS PICKED UP BY SOUND

No	Depth Water	Own Speed and Depth		Est. Tonnage Target Speed		ther Sound ear in use
1.	50 F	2.6 kts 63	350 1 Small A 2 Escort	K 600 400	JP	QB ·
3.		2.6 kts 631	355 2 Coaster: 1 Sub Char 1 Conv. Es	er 250	JP	QB
6.	21 F	2.6 kts	265 1 CA 1 DD	10,000	JP	QB
7. .	23 F	2.6 kts 631	020 1 CA 1 DD	10,000 1,200	JP	QB

(G) AIRCRAFT CONTACTS

All convoys moving during daylight hours had air cover- usually RIFES. The heavy cruiser encountered on 5 June had a 4 plane escort - (2) HETTYS and (2) ZEKES.

No new types were encountered.

(H) ATTACK DATA

U.S.S. CHUB (SS 329) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1 PATROL NO. 2

Time 1339:30 Date 20 May 1945 Lati 06-18 S Long. 116-05 E4

Target Data - Damage Inflicted

Description:

600 ton inter-island Freighter converted for escort duty, single stack, raised forward, amidships, and aft, with a single tripod mast built up above the bridge, possibly for radar antenna. He was escorting a small, engines aft AK, 600-800 tons, but because of his higher superstructure he was assumed to be the bigger target. Just before firing his true nature was discovered, but by then he was tracking so well that three torpedoes were fired at him. Propellers were picked up by sound at about 18,000 yards. The sea was slightly choppy with two foot swells. The ships were sighted by periscope at 14,000 yards.

Ships Sunk: None

Ships Damaged or Probably Sunk: None

Damage Determined by:

Target Draft 61 Course 020 Speed 9 Range 3,000 (at firing).

Own Ship Data

Speed 2.5 Course 300-304 Depth 65! Angle 10 Dive (at firing).

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack:

Periscope approach. ST ranges were used from 8,000 yards into 4,500 yards, when stadimeter ranges were again used until time of firing. The target checked very well at 9 knots. About two and a half minutes after the first torpedo was fired, the target apparently detected the torpedoes and zigged towards. It is believed this caused all three torpedoes to pass ahead of the target.

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 1

Tubes Fired	eria. Da ll aga especiale	. 	3
Track Angle	105 - 30 S	104-30 6	107 6
Gyro Angle	004-30	002-30	003-30
Depth Set	A Paris Line	4	4
Speed Used	9. kts	9 kts	9 kts
Hit or Miss	Miss	Wiss	Miss
Erratic	No	No	· No
Mark Torpedo	18-1	18-1	18-2
Serial No.	56015	55348	57781
Mark Exploder	8-3	8-5	8-7
Serial No.	9480	15768	8055
Actuation Set	Contact	Contact	Contact
Mark Warhead	18-2	18-2	18-2
Serial No.	2748	3232	4315
Explosive	Torpex 2	Torpex 2	Torpex 2
Firing Intervals	12 sec	12 sec	12 sec
Type Spread	3	3	3
Length of Run	3,200 yds	3,200 yds	3,200 yds
Duration of Run			
Sea Conditions	Idght Swells		,
Temp, of Electrolyte	80 ⁰ F	80° F	80° F
Injection Temp.	80° F	80° F	80 ⁰ F
Overheul Activity	N.T.D.	S.R.U.	Navy 137

- U.S.S. CHUB (SS 329) SECOND WAR PATROL REPORT U.S.S. CHUB (SS 329) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. PATROL NO. Time 0248:30 Date 21 May 1945 Let. <u>6-15 S Long. 116-01</u> Target Data - Damage Inflicted Description: Single Ship. AM,DE, or DD (600 tons), picked up at 18,000 yards by SJ radar. At 3,000 yards the target, observed thru the ST periscope was a hazy image with general contour of an AM,DE, or DD. Ships Sunk: One 600 ton AM or DE or DD. Ships Damaged or Probably Sunk: Damage Determined by: One timed hit, after which the target's screws and pinging stopped. Four minutes later a tremendous explosion was heard. It was much too loud to be a depth charge as far away as the target was. Upon surfacing 40 minutes later, SJ could get no contact on the target. A heavy, fresh, strong smelling oil slick and floating debris were found at scone of attack. Targot Draft: Course Range 3,000 (at firing) Speed Own Ship Data Course 212-208 Depth Angle 10 Dive (at firing). Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack:

The target was tracked by SJ radar on the surface for 60 minutes. Submerged 13,000 yards ahead and completed attack using ST ranges and JT sound bearings. JT sound bearings, using RLI were excellent and consistent and considered more reliable than periscope bearings. The target was changing speed all through the approach from 8 to 17 knots, and at one time slowed to 4 knots. He was zigging every 5 minutes from 065 to 105. During the final stages of the approach he checked right on 13 knots. At 3100 yards he zigged to 1050 putting us on an 830 port track. One minute later 5 torpedoes were fired. Too much cannot be said for the value and accuracy of the combination of ST ranges and JT bearings on a single target when the target cannot be seen clearly and yet detection on the surface is possible by the enemy's radar.

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Tubes Fired		2	3	4	5
Track Angle	98 P	98-30 F	100-30 P	102 P	104 P
Gyro Angle	335-30	336-30	334-30	332	331
Depth Set	4	5	4	5	4
Speed Used	13 kts	13 kts	13 kts	13 kts	13 kts
Hit or Miss	Miss	Hit	Miss	Miss	Miss
Erratic	No	No	No .	No	No
Mark Torpedo	18-1	18-1	18-1	18-1	18-2
Serial No.	55259	55350	53369	56992	57875
Mark Exploder	875	8-5	8-5	8-5	85
Serial No.	10226	8954	10342	11533	11001
Actuation Set	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact
Mark Warhead	18-1	18-2	18-2	18-2	18-2
Serial No.	4311	2009	1515	4324	3970
Explosive	Torpex 2	Torpex 2	Torpex 2	Torpex 2	Torpex 2
Firing Interval	10 sec	lÖ sec	10 sec	10 sec	10 sec
Type Spread	Divergent	Divergent	Divergent	Divergent	Divergent
Length of Run	2,900 yds	2,900 yds	2,900 yds	2,900 yds	2,900 yds
Duration of Run	3 Minutes	00 Seconds		:	
Sea Conditions	Light Swel	.ls		· ·	
Temp. of Electro.	80° F	80° F,	80° F	80° F	80° F
Injection Temp.	80° F	80 ⁰ F	80 ⁰ F	80° F	80° F
Averhaul Activity	N.T.D.	S.R.U.	Nevy 137		
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CONFIDENTIAL -	U.S.S. CHUB (SS 329) SECOND WAR PATROL REPORT.
U.S.S. CHUB (S	S 329) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 3 PATROL NO. 2
Timo 0502	Date 1 June 1945 Lat. 04-48 S Long. 115 E.
	Target Data - Damage Inflicted
Description:	Two ship convoy. 800-900 ton Freighter, mast funnel mast, with an especially tall stack, raised aft and possibly amidships and forward. Escorted by a PC, stationed on the target's starboard bow. The target was picked up by SJ radar at 14,000 yards. Visibility was poor especially at the time of firing when the target entered a rain squall. The sea was slightly choppy with three foot swells.
Ships Sunk:	None
Ships Damaged	or Probably Sunk: None
Damage Determi	ed by:
Target Draft	61 Course 070 Speed 7 Range 1.450 (at firing
	Own Ship Data
Speed11	Course 269 Depth Surf. Angle
	Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack:

Radar surface approach. The target was tracked for an hour and 32 minutes. The lobing motor was out of commission and bearings were accurate only within 5 degrees. The target tracked very well at 9.5 knots on base course 260, zigging every 5 minutes from 240 to 280. TBT bearings were used inside of 3,500 yards. Three estimates of angle on the bow were made when lightning flashes lighted up the target. On each occasion the observed angle on the bow agreed exactly with that generated. The attack was made from the target's port quarter on a 140° track when the target was on the 240° leg. Neither the target nor the escort gave any indication of detecting us. The reason for the miss is unexplanable unless the torpedoes ran deep.

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 3

	TORPEDU ATTAOR I		
Tubes Fired	6	5 - San	4
and the state of t	144 P	144 P	144 P
Track Angle Gyro Angle	007-30	008	004-50
Depth Set	4	e 🚣 e ye yê tir. Tir. Tir. Tir. Tir. Tir. Tir. Tir. T	
Annual Annual Annual Annual Annua	9.5 kts	9.5 kts	9.5 kts
Speed Used	Miss	Miss	Miss
Hit or Miss	No	No	No.
Erratic		18-1	18-2
Mark Torpedoes	58104	56567	57945
Serial No.	8-5	8-5	8-5
Mark Exploder	10088	11203	9871
Serial No.	Contact	Contact -	Contact
Actuation Set	18 - 2	18-2	18-2
Mark Warhead		3012	1353
Serial No.	3475 Torpex 2	Torpex 2	Torpex 2
Explosive	i.	10 sec	10 sec
Firing Interval	10 sec	Divergent	Divergent
Type Spread	Divergent	1,890 yds	1,860 yds
Length of Run	1,900 yds	1,070 ,448	4, ,
Duration of Run		er gestellt som i stellt i gestellt som efter i flegge	
Sea Conditions	Might Swells	erang erang erang erang. Sagarang erang	84° F
Temp. of Electrolyte	84 ⁰ F 84 ⁰ F	6,0 R	84° F
Injection Temp.		S.R.U.	Navy 137
Overheul Activity	N.T.D.	Date of	and the same

U.S.S. CHUB (SS 329) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. PATROL NO. Time 0805 Date 1 June 1945 Let. 04-56 S Long. 115-16 E. Target Data - Damage Inflicted Two ship convoy. 1,200 ton Freighter, mast funnel mast, raised, amidships, and aft. Escorted by a PC stationed Description: on the target's starboard bow. Target was picked up by SJ radar at 14,000 yards. After sunrise visibility was good. The sea was slightly choppy with three foot swells. None Ships Sunk: Ships Damaged or Probably Sunk: Damage Determined by: Target Draft_ Course 240 Speed 9.5 Own Ship Data Depth 651 Fire Control and Torpedo Data Type Attack: Submerged approach. The target was tracked by radar for 38 minutes. We then submerged at 12,000 yards range, 10° on the target's starboard bow for a dawn attack. Using ST ranges in to 4,100 yards. We pulled straight across the target's track to get in position for a stern shot. Five minutes before firing the target made a 20° zig to his left. Three steam torpedoes were fired from the stern tubes on an 82-84 port track,

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until the torpedoes had passed under him.

1,400 yard rum. All three torpedoes were seen to pass under the target. The target did not maneuver to avoid

TORPEDO ATTACK NO. A

Tubes Fired	8	9	10
	. 82 P	-83 P	84 - 30 P
Gyro Angle	182	182-20	177-40
Depth Set	5	5	5
Speed Used	7 kts	7 kts	7 kts
Hit or Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss
Erratic	No	No	No
Mark Torpedo	14-3/\	14-34	14-34
Serial No.	63551	66290	64154
Mark Exploder	6-5	6-5	6-5
Serial No.	25507	25523	25631
Actuation Set	Contact	Contact	Contact
Mark Warhead	16-1	16-1	16-1
Serial No.	16421	12852	14389
Explosive	Torpex 2	Torpex 2	Torpex 2
Firing Interval	8 sec	8 sec	8 sec
Type Spread	Divergent	Divergent	Divergent
Length of Run	1,400 yds	1,400 yds	1,420 yds
Duration of Run			
Sea Conditions	Idght Swells		
Temp. of Electrolyte	84° F	84° F	84° F
Injection Temp.	840 F	84° F	84° F
Overhaul Activity	N.T.D.	S.R.U.	Navy 137

CONFIDENTIAL - U.S.S. CHUB (SS 329) SECOND WAR PATROL REPORT. U.S.S. CHUB (SS 329) TORPEDO ATTACK NO. 5 PATROL NO. Date 14 June 1945 Let. 04-41 S Long. 106-2 Target Data - Damage Inflicted Unidentified. Largest of four ships in column. target was picked up by SJ radar at 10,100 yard Sensitivity of the radar was known to be low at the time. The target was visible from the bridge at 7,000 yards. It was a clear night with no moon. The sea was calm. Ships Sunk: One unidentified. Ships Damaged or Probably Sunk: None Damage Determined by: Double explosion a few seconds apart. The explosion was seen from the bridge by the C.O., O.O.D., and by one lookout. The second was either an internal explosion in the target or a torpedo hit in a second target. Immediately after the explosions the main pip on the radar showed all the characteristics of a rain cloud and then disappeared. The target could not be located by sight shortly after the explosions. Course 050 Speed 4.5 Range 2.535-2.400 (at firing) Target Draft Own Ship Data

Fire Control and Torpedo Data

Type Attack: Surface radar approach. The target was tracked for 54 minutes. TBT bearings were used inside of 3,500 yards. The target changed course twice during the approach but had no apparent zig plan. Speed check was good at 4.5 knots. The target gave no indications of detecting us.

CORPEDO ATTACK NO. 5

				and the second	
Tubes Fired	1	2	3	4	6
Track Angle	144 S	144 S	144 S	145 S	145 S
Gyro Angle	004	004}	0032	005	006
Depth Set	3	4	3.	4	2
Speed Used	4.5 kts	4.5 kts	4.5 kts	4.5 kts	4.5 kts
Hit or Miss	Miss	Miss	Miss	Hit	Pos. Hit
Erratic	No	No	No	No	No
Mark Torpedo	18-1	18-2	18-1	18-1	18-2
Serial No.	54226	57335	56781	53979	58100
Mark Exploder	8-5	8-5	85	8 -5	8-5
Serial No.	8465	11433	11502	11579	10722
Actuation Set	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact	Contact
Mark Warhead	18-2	18-2	18-2	18-2	18-2
Serial No.	3347	4298	3215	3490	4322
Explosive	Torpex 2	Terpex 2	Torpex 2	Torpex 2	Torpex 2
Firing Interval	10 sec	10 sec	10 sec	10 sec	10 sec
Type Spread	Divergent	Divergent	Divergent	Divergent	Divergent
Length of Run	2,700 yds	2,675 yds	2,625 yds	2,600 yds	2,550 yds
Duration of Run		e Line to washing the co		2 M 50 S	2 M 54 S
Sea Conditions	Calm			·	
Temp of Electro.	84° F	84 ⁰ F	84° F	84° F	84° F
Injection Temp.	84° F	84 ⁰ F	84° F	84° F	84° F
Overhaul Activity	N.T.D.	S.R.U.	Nevy 137		

(I) MINES

None Encountered.

(J) ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES AND EVASION TACTICS

In the Java Sea, targets worthy of torpedo fire normally have air cover during the day, as well as surface escort. The potential value of a smoke contact can usually be ascertained by looking above it for a float plane. No radar equipped night search planes were encountered. Detection and bombing of the CHUB on 5 June is attributed to our remaining too long at periscope depth in vicinity of four plane air cover, when sea, though slightly choppy, had no white caps.

On 20 May the converted freighter type escort was evaded by slow speed running at 200 feet. Although he dropped 12 depth charges, he is not believed to have had definite contact on us at any time. He did not use echo-ranging.

On 1 June, following an unsuccessful attack with Mk 14 torpedces, a PC or SCS-51 class escort was evaded by firing 1 false target shell, 1 NAC beacon, and I more false target shell. We then cleared the point by running between 90 and 100 feet at a speed of 4 knots. The escort was later observed to drop 15 depth charges in the vicinity of the false target shells. Prior to dropping depth charges, it is suspected that this escort may have dropped centact projectiles. There is no evidence to substantiate this suspicion except the 47 minute time lag between our attack and the first barrage of depth charges.

Sunda Strait appears to be patrolled by a sub chaser which spends most of his time in the vicinity of Toppers Island and seldom ventures out into the center of the strait.

Night patrol boats were encountered Northeast of the Thousand Islands and near the entrance to Banteen Bay. In each case we were challenged by blinker light. These craft were avoided by turning away at high speed.

(K) MAJOR DEFECTS AND DAMAGE

HULL

Installed missing gasket in hydraulic accumulator to remedy air leak.

Installed shims under Third Stage head of No. 1 air compressor to give proper clearance. Compressor would not deliver maximum output.

MACHINERY:

Renewed two cracked liners on No. 3 main engine.

Attached salt water pump on No. 1 main engine failed. Found both ball bearings carried away. Installed spare pump.

ORDNANCE AND GUNNERY

None.

(L) RADIO

DEFECTS:

None noted.

RECEPTION. TRANSMISSIONS AND REMARKS:

Reception of VIXO was good for first two days before shifting to NPTI.

Reception of NFT1 was difficult during first two weeks due to distance and transmitting troubles.

The frequencies most used were 9250 kcs and 4370 kcs. At times 9250 kcs faded out in the morning and afternoon when 12630 kcs and 4370 kcs were heard with a good signal.

The only interference experienced on this schedule was from a broadcast station on 9250 kcs, whose carrier would block NFT1 signals. By turning off the receiver beat oscillator we were able to copy NFT1 due to NFT1's signals beating with the broadcast carrier.

The lifeguard frequency of 4475 was guarded whenever friendly planes were known to be in the area with no interference. The signals received were weak due to distance.

Difficulties were again experienced with VHF in communication with friendly submarines and reception faded completely at ranges in excess of 2,000 yards.

The WOIFPAC frequencies were guarded continuously in area with good results.

Seven ship to shore transmissions were made during this patrol. The first was receipted for by NPT1 on 8470 kcs, second and

third by VHM on 4235 kcs, fourth by VIXO on 4235 kcs, the fifth was receipted for by VHM on 4235 kcs with the correct anthenticator but message did not reach addressee, the sixth was received by VIXO on 4235 kcs and the last by VHM on 8470 kcs.

During June enemy signals were heard on the new frequencies but did not interfere with communications.

A message from the BALAO was intercepted at a distance of 2,800 miles, (WOPACO area frequency).

(M) RADAR

MODEL SJ-1 OPERATION:

The operation of the SJ radar during this patrol was poor and frequent material troubles resulted in the equipment being often out of commission.

The SJ was operated continually while on the surface as a guard against low flying planes.

MATERIAL AND MAINTAINANCE:

The material condition of the SJ was very poor and frequent equipment failures resulted in many hours lost operation and continued servicing and maintainance while submerged.

The following equipment failures were experienced:

Intermittent low transmitter high voltage (1000), high on-time current (250), double sweeps, apparent change in frequency, compensation voltage low.

With this trouble in the equipment the H.V. Rectifier, Mod. Generator, and associated circuits and tubes in the transmitter were checked to be hot straight and normal, including waveforms.

This trouble caused the radar gang many sleepless hours and "circuit headaches". Severe jolting of the transmitter case would intermittently cause the trouble. After a final jolting at the end of a week of profitless trouble-shooting it disappeared entirely and never came back again. Wow!

High voltage meter reading low (900) R44 meter multiplier in Selector Unit had changed in value from 1.5 to 1 Meg. Replaced for normal operation.

No sweeps PPI and Range Ind. All moters normal. This was caused by the burned out high voltage winding of the H.V.

transformer T-1 in the Range Ind. No spare was carried for this transformer so the spare transformer in the H.V. circuit of the SD Range Ind. was used. This transformer is 350 volts higher than

the SJ but gave satisfactory operation.

There were no apparent causes for the failure of this transformer, being no grounds and all circuit elements checking properly. However, the filter resistor, R62, normally 150,000 ohms, 10 watts had been replaced during the last refit by a 48,000 ohm, 2 watt resistor - presumably a modification for the ST installation. This resistor, though measuring 48,000 ohms, showed signs of being overheated and was replaced with the 150,000 resistor in spares.

The increase in current caused by the substitution of this resistor may have been responsible for the transformer's

failure.

High voltage fuses burn out when equipment is started. Replaced the 836's H.V. rectifier tubes.

Intermittent grass on "A" scope, replaced defective 6407.

No PPI presentation, replaced burned out resistor, R44, with spare. Before replacement the H.V. circuit was checked as to resistances and circuit elements (normal). The spare lasted three days and burned out.

There was no spare 7 meg. resistor of sufficient wattage on board and attempts to repair the defective one were fruitless. The PPI was out for a day and a night until a spare was obtained

from the U.S.S. BLENNY.

This time the cause was discovered due to the retaining bushing on the PPI range selector switch grounding out the LP lamp (pilot) and consequently 220,000 ohms of bleeder resistance.

The modification of the 20,000 yd PPI sweeps was made

The modification of the 20,000 yd PPI sweeps was made during the last refit and when the switch was replaced the nut holding the bushing in place was left off allowing the bushing to be jarred loose.

As the unit was on its side on the deck when the first

check was made the trouble and/or bushing was free.

Lobing out. Replaced broken brush on lobing 115 volt supply slip ring.

Persistant 1,500 yd tunable falso ccho, replaced magnetron.

No line voltage. Defective line switch. Strapped out defective side.

RADAR SD-5

The performance of the SD during this patrol was good and the ranges obtained on planes were good. While on the surface the SD was keyed at one minute intervals during the day and two minute intervals at night.

With the new long persistent screen of the SD-5 it was only

necessary to key the equipment for one second.

It was found that echos, particularly distant ones (15 miles), could be more easily seen on the 80 mile sweep, sometimes not even appearing on the expanded 20 mile sweep.

The only material trouble was arcing 8014's

Radar st

The ST radar gave very good performance during the patrol. A little trouble was experienced with the tuning drifting but this was mot by constantly checking against the esho box while being used.

Ranges obtained were good for this gear. Typical ranges were 10,000 yds on a small AM with seven foot periscope exposure, and 6,000 yds on 125 foot land at two foot exposure.

The success of the ST for submerged night attack has been detailed under SOUND.

No material maintainance was required other than normal routines and the only equipment casualty was the breaking of the plastic window in the Adaptor wave guide.

In connection with this casualty it should be mentioned that the mica window in the adaptor wave guide was not made to be easily replaced. The brass collar that holds it in place is in such a position that it cannot be removed without a special tool or dismantling the adaptor unit. Inasmuch as this would seem to be a possible frequent casualty, some means of rapid and simple replacement should be provided.

(N) SOMER GEAR AND SOUND CONDITION

The JK-QC and the QB sound gear turned in its normal good performance during this patrol. The gear was manned continually while submerged and on the surface at speeds up to fifteen knots.

During the latter part of the patrol both sound shafts became noisy and developed what was apparently a hydraulic knock. This knock and binding seems to be between the inner stationary piston and the shaft cylinder. It is suspected that the shafts are out of alignment due to either a bomb explosion or scraping of the heads on the bottom. The starboard QC head also gives evidence of being about 90 degrees off in bearing and damage to the head is suspected.

The JP topside gear gave excellent performance. Besides detecting enemy screws at great ranges it was also good for locating own ship's noises. Small patrol ships were detected when their mast were below the horizon at a depth of 58 feet. An enemy

heavy cruiser was tracked at ranges greater than 40,000 yards.

Too much can not be said for the JT sound equipment. The accuracy of the bearings († to 1 degree) was definitely proved during a successful torpedo attack in which all bearings obtained were from the JT:

The combination of the ST radar ranges and JT sound bearings is ideal for a night submerged attack on a single ship. Ranges were given to the TDC from the ST immediately following the JT bearings and resulted in a porfect problem solution.

The CHUB feels that the JT with its associated power training and RLI is the best sound equipment that has yet been installed in our submarines.

(O) DENSITY LAYERS

In the area around the Southeast corner of Borneo clear negative gradients were obtained on almost every dive. These were two to three degrees and began at about 125 feet extending to 150 to 200 feet.

In the lambol area a six degree gradient was obtained starting at 125 feet and extending to 180 feet.

The area about the Thousand Islands and the Northwestern tip of Java was entirely insothermal.

(P) HEATTH, FOOD AND HABITABILITY

HEALTH:

The health of the crew in general has been excellent. The MoMMs and the baker were troubled with heat rash the first half of the patrol run. Two minor injuries occured causing some extra work for the Radio and Quartermaster gangs, and one man was troubled with a kidney.

FOOD:

The food was good and well prepared. The baking was excellent.

HABITABILITY

The boat was cool and comfortable throughout most of the run. There were times during the first of the patrol, however, when the air conditioning could have been better.

(Q) PERSONNEL

(a)	Number	of mon	detached after previous patroll	L.
(b)	Number	of men	on board during patrol	9
(c)	Number	of men	qualified at start of patrol	Ĺ
(d)	Number	of men	qualified at end of patrol.	7
(a)	Number	of men	unqualified making their first patrol 1	Ó
			·	

COMMENTS

The performance of duty of both officers and men was excellent.

(R) MILES STEAMED - FUEL USED

		. 6	MTIES .	GALLONS
Base to area			1,579.5	20,438
In area	angala kan kan ka	Acces 1 1	7,058.8	82,697
Area to base			1,201	14,545

(S) DURATION

	ing the second of the second o	•	. •	*		DAY
Days	enroute to	arca		 		. 5
Days	in area		: .			30
Days	enroute to	bese		•		3
Days	Submerged	. 3				23

(T) FACTORS OF ENDURANCE REMAINING

TORPEDOES FUEL PROVISIONS PERSONNEL FACTOR
2 2,600 20 Days 14 Days

Limiting factor this patrol: Torpedoes.

(U) COMMUNICATION, RADAR, AND SONAR COUNTERMEASURES

COMMUNICATION COUNTERMEASURES

No enemy signals were intercepted.

The usual expected jamming and interference was experienced with none of it being too effective. Foreign voice interference was encountered on all the June WOLFFAC frequencies.

RADAR COUNTERMEASURES

None.

SONAR COUNTERMEASURES

None.

(V) REMARKS

This patrol was handicapped throughout by poor and unreliable performance of the SJ radar. This equipment often went out of commission at the most inopportune time. Towards the end of the patrol the sensitivity of the radar became definitely low and the equipment could not be depended on to give warning of the nearby presence of small graft.

The performance of the JT sound gear (JP with RLI) on this patrol was excellent. On several occasions this equipment picked up propeller noises beyond the range of visibility.

It was most disappointing to see the Jap heavy cruiser slip by us twice without getting off a shot. On the first try we came close but were still outguessed. On the second passage we were completely outguessed.

All hands worked hard this patrol and we feel that we gave the Japs a good run for their money. We do not have a great deal to show for the number of torpedoes we fired; but we feel that a lower percentage of hits must be expected nowadays. Ships are scarce, most of them are small, and the small ones are harder to hit than the large ones.

The directives of Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET confidential letter FE24-71/113-1 Serial 0243 of 2 February 1945 have been complied with.

00/Bn

Serial 0138

CONFIDENT LAL

Care of Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California, 24 June 1945.

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to U.S.S. CHUB (SS329) -Report of Second War Patrol.

From: To: Commander Submarine Squadron Twenty-two. Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Via:

(1) Commander Submarines, SEVENTH FLEET.

(2) Commander, SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject:

U.S.S. CHUB (SS329) - Report of Second War Patrol.

- 1. The U.S.S. CHUB (SS329) departed FREMANTIE, W.A., 14 May 1945, on her second war patrol under the command of Commander C. D. RHYMES, Jr., U.S. Navy. She arrived SUBIC BAY, LUZON, P.I., on 21 June 1945, after a patrol of thirty-eight (38) days, of which thirty (30) days were spent in assigned areas in the JAVA SEA.
- 2. Lrea coverage was good. Handicapped by the material difficulties and failures of the SJ radar, nevertheless an aggressive search was made for targets in shallow and confined waters.
- 3. Torpedo Lttack #1. In a day periscope attack on 20 May, attacked a 600 ton escort of converted freighter type escorting a small engine-aft freighter. Fired three (3) Mk. 18-1 torpedoes, torpedo run 3200 yds., average track angle 106 S, average gyro angle 003°, depth set 4 feet. No hits, target apparently detected and avoided torpedoes.

Torpedo Attack #2. On 21 May, in a night submerged approach using ST radar and JT sound bearings, fired five (5) torpedoes at an AM-DE type target. Torpedo run 2900 yds., average track 101 P, average gry 333°, depth set 4 and 5 feet. One hit. Target sink.

Torpedo attack #2. 1 June. In a night surface radar attack, fired three (3) Mk. 18-1 torpedoes at a small escorted AK. Torpedo run 1875 yds., average track 144 P, average gyro 006°, depth set 4 feet. No hits. Torpedoes may have run under target, more likely misses may be attributed to control errors with a foreshortened target.

Torpedo Attack #4. 1 June. In a day periscope attack on a 1200 ton stack aft freighter escorted by one (1) SCS-51 sub chaser, fired three (3) Mk. 14 torpedoes, depth set 6 feet, torpedo run 1400 yds., average track 820 P, average gyro angle 181°. No hits. Torpedoes passed under target.

Torpedo Attack #5. 14 June. Night surface radar attack on four (4) ship convoy, using TBT bearings, fired five (5) Mk. 18-1 torpedoes, terpedo run 2650 yds., average track 1440 S, depths set 2, 3, and 4 feet staggered. One, possibly two, hits. Target, estimated approximately 1000 tons by the Commanding Officer, sunk.

FC5-22/..16-3

SUBMARINE SQUADRON TWENTY-TWO

Serial 0138

24 June 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject:

U.S.S. CHUB (SS329) - Report of Second War Patrol.

- Successful use was made of false target shells and N.C Beacon in evasion following the unsuccessful attack on 1 June.
- The CHUB returned from patrol in an excellent state of cleanliness. a normal refit is indicated with docking schoduled to determine possible damage from bottoming in mud. The SJ radar will be given most diligent attention in order to insure that this smart ship is not handicapped on her next patrol.
- The Commanding Officer, officers and crew are congratulated upon the completion of this alert and aggressive patrol and for the damage inflicted upon the enemy.

A STATE OF THE STA

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TON THE

Serial 0174x

3 July 1945

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to USS CHUB Conf. Ltr. A16-3 Serial 065, dated 21 June, 1945. Report of Second War Patrol.

From:

The Commander Submarines SEVENTH FLEST.

To:

The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES FLEET.

Via:

The Commander SEVENTH FLEET.

Subject:

U.S.S. CHUB (SS329) - Report of Second War

Patrol - Comment on.

The Second War Patrol of the U.S.S. CHUB (SS329) under the command of Commander C. D. RHYMES, Jr., U.S.N., was conducted in assigned areas in the JAVA SEA.

- Although hampered the entire patrol by material dif-ficulties and failures of the SJ radar, the CHUB aggressively searched out and made five torpedo attacks on enemy shipping. Two of these attacks resulted in damage to the enemy. It is regretable that the CHUB was not able to close the HAGURO class heavy cruiser with a MINEKAZE class DD escort which were sighted on 5 June and again on 7 June.
- The award of the Submarine Combat Insignia is authorized for this patrol.
- The Force Commander congratulates the CHUB on her aggressiveness in penetraling shallow and confined waters to seek out the enemy at a time when his shipping is extremely scarce and each ship extremely valuable to him. The CHUB is credited with inflicting the following damage on the enemy:

Freighter (EU)

600 Tons. 630 Tons.

I Unident (EU) 500 Tons.

Total 2,730 Tons.

This sinking covered by special report.

05114

FE24-71/A16-3

UNITTED STATES NAVY

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to: USS CHUB Conf. Ltr. A16-3 Serial 065, dated 21 June, 1945. Report of Second War Patrol.

Subject:

U.S.S. CHUB (SS329) - Report of Second War Patrol - Comment on.

3 July 1945

Cominch - (3) Direct	GTG-71,8	(2)
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Opnav Op-23e	1)	ComSubRon-26	(2)
ComlstFlt		ComSubRon-30	(2)
Com2ndFlt		DivComsSubRon-22	(leach)
Com7thFlt (3 ComSubslstFlt (3	ő	DivComsSubRon-26	1 each)
r i Herita de la Carta de la	4	DivComsSubRon-30 S/M School, N.L. Conn.	l each)
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Flag Secretary.

RE NO F574 NO F514 REG. NO 780

UNITED STATES FLEET COMMANDER SEVENTH FLEET

Al6-3(8)(F-3c/cgj)

Serial: 04983

20 JUL 1945

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

THIRD ENDORSEMENT to: CO USS CHUB conf ltr Al6-3, serial 065, dated 21 June 1945.

From:

Commander Seventh Fleet.

To :

Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject:

U.S.S. CHUB (SS329) - Report of Second War

Patrol - comment on.

1. Forwarded.

2. The Commander Seventh Fleet congratulates the CHUB for damage inflicted on the enemy.

T. C. KINKAID

Copy to:
ComSubs7th
ComSubRon=22

CO USS CHUB (SS329)